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Democratic Inclusion, Cognitive 
Development, and the Age of Electoral 
Majority 
Vivian E. Hamilton† 
INTRODUCTION 
Who should vote in the modern democratic state? The 
question implicates the core of democratic government—
popular political participation. And the vote is the archetypical 
participatory mechanism. For centuries, voting was a privilege 
limited to few, but democratic norms now require that electoral 
inclusion be presumed, and exclusion justified.1 Accordingly, 
few exclusionary rules remain. Among them are citizenship, 
law-abidingness, and minimum age requirements. The last of 
these, all but ignored by legal and political theorists, is this 
article’s focus. 
The age of electoral majority has declined, over time and 
across the globe. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
average voting age worldwide was just under twenty-four; 
today, it is just over seventeen. More than a dozen nations have 
recently lowered local, state, or national voting ages to sixteen. 
  
 † Associate Professor of Law, William & Mary School of Law. J.D. Harvard Law 
School, B.A. Yale College. I am grateful to Ludvig Beckman, Emily Buss, Naomi Cahn, 
June Carbone, Neal Devins, James Dwyer, Catherine Ross, and Timothy Zick for their 
generous comments on earlier drafts. Michael Green and Eric Kades provided thoughtful 
guidance in the project’s earliest stages. I also thank Research Librarian Fred Dingledy 
and Research Assistants Jana Robinson and Rebecca Sandler for their excellent research 
assistance. Finally, the editors of the Brooklyn Law Review provided sophisticated and 
insightful substantive feedback and have been a true pleasure to work with. 
 1 The Supreme Court has invalidated exclusions based on occupation, income, 
marital status, and property ownership/tax payment. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 
140-41 (1970) (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (listing cases). See 
generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 2009) (chronicling the imposition and 
subsequent lifting of voting restrictions over time in the United States). For extended 
analyses of specific exclusions, see, for example, RON HAYDUK, DEMOCRACY FOR ALL: 
RESTORING IMMIGRANT VOTING RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2006); JEFF MANZA & 
CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY (2006); Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, 
and the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (2004). 
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Others, including Australia and the United Kingdom, are 
seriously considering doing the same. The voting age in every 
U.S. state is eighteen, but the United States is not among the 
growing number of democracies deliberating the electoral 
inclusion of some cohort of their younger citizens. It should be. 
Presumably, eighteen is a proxy for voters’ attainment of 
desirable characteristics—e.g., maturity of judgment, knowledge 
of civics, and understanding of political processes. Yet there has 
been no sustained scholarly effort to examine whether age 
eighteen is a good, or even good-enough, indicator of the 
attainment of those or other relevant characteristics. Academic 
inattention persists2 despite widespread acceptance that the 
franchise is the core of modern representative democracy; its 
“free and unimpaired [exercise] preserv[es] . . . other basic civil 
and political rights.”3 
I argue that presumptive electoral inclusion places on the 
state the burden of justifying the exclusion of a category of 
persons. Assessing the legitimacy of any exclusion requires a 
minimum standard for electoral inclusion. That standard 
legitimately includes competence. Assessing competence 
likewise first requires a conception of it, but none currently 
exists. Classic democratic theory describes the decision making 
of the ideal citizen-voter as both well informed and rational. The 
decision making of the actual citizen-voter, however, is often 
neither. The classic account thus cannot define competence, 
which contemplates a minimum standard of adequacy, not an 
aspirational ideal rarely attained. I thus argue for a conception 
of electoral competence first, informed by behavioral decision 
theory and studies of voter decision making, and second, 
characterized by the reliable attainment of the relevant 
cognitive processes (cognition/learning, information processing, 
and decision making) and maturity of judgment. 
Converging research from several disciplines within the 
developmental sciences has established a reliable connection 
  
 2 Stefan Olsson, Children’s Suffrage: A Critique of the Importance of Voters’ 
Knowledge for the Well-Being of Democracy, 16 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 55, 55 (2008) (“That 
children should not have the right to vote is something that most people think . . . is so 
obvious that almost none of the prominent democratic theorists have given it any serious 
consideration. It is a non-issue.”). 
 3 Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) (“[S]ince 
the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of 
other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to 
vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 
U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (“The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the 
essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of 
representative government.”). 
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between age range and the attainment of certain cognitive 
competencies. Research in developmental psychology and 
cognitive and social neuroscience explains not only that 
adolescents make notoriously bad decisions under certain 
conditions, but also why it is they do so. This research explains 
that by midadolescence, when making unpressured, considered 
decisions—like those required to privately cast a ballot in an 
election that has unfolded over time—their cognitive 
competencies are mature. 
States can thus no longer justify the electoral exclusion 
of midadolescents by claiming that they lack the relevant 
competencies. Absent other legitimate bases for their exclusion, 
the democratic presumption of inclusion obliges the states to 
adjust downward the age of electoral majority. 
In the United States, the individual states retain broad 
power to establish electoral qualifications, subject to certain 
constitutional and other federal law constraints.4 The Twenty-
Sixth Amendment, for example, prohibits states from setting 
the age of electoral majority above eighteen.5 No constitutional 
or other federal law provision, however, prohibits states from 
lowering the age of electoral majority; each state retains that 
power.6 Yet other than a few states that allow seventeen-year-
olds to vote in a primary election so long as they will turn 
eighteen in time for the general election,7 no state has 
  
 4 Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50-51 (1959) 
(“The States have long been held to have broad powers to determine the conditions 
under which the right of suffrage may be exercised absent of course the discrimination 
which the Constitution condemns.” (citations omitted)). The U.S. Constitution gives 
state legislatures the authority to establish “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding 
Elections for [U.S.] Senators and Representatives,” but it reserves to Congress the 
right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Place of 
chusing Senators.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 
663, 665 (1966) (recognizing the franchise as a conditional fundamental right by 
providing that “once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn 
which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment”); id. at 670 (holding that state laws restricting individuals’ right to vote 
will be subject to the Court’s strict scrutiny). 
 5 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States, 
who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or by any State on account of age.”). 
 6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 & amend. XVII (providing that in statewide elections 
for congressional representatives and senators, “the Electors in each State shall have the 
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State 
Legislature”); Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 51 (“[W]hile the right of suffrage is established and 
guaranteed by the Constitution, it is subject to the imposition of state standards which 
are not discriminatory and which do not contravene any restriction that Congress, acting 
pursuant to its constitutional powers, has imposed.” (citations omitted)). 
 7 See infra Part I.C.4. 
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exercised—nor seriously considered exercising—its power to 
lower the voting age. 
The Twenty-Sixth Amendment’s exclusion of individuals 
under eighteen from explicit constitutional protection 
undermines constitutionally grounded arguments for lowering 
the voting age. Any court that held the enfranchisement of 
citizens younger than eighteen constitutionally compelled 
would thus depart from well over a century of established 
precedent.8 Constitutional compulsion, however, is not the 
sole—or even primary—justification for most state action. 
I argue here that the core democratic principle of 
inclusion (embraced by democracy theorists and political 
entities, and from which derives the concept of 
“universal . . . suffrage”)9 places on states the burden of 
justifying electoral exclusions. Moreover, in light of decades of 
research on voter decision making and significant advances 
across various scientific disciplines in knowledge of cognitive 
and psychological development, the time has come to revisit 
and if warranted, readjust, the age of electoral majority. 
We can surmise the reasoning of one who believes that 
the voting age merits little attention10: (a) age is a reasonable—  
 8 The Supreme Court has held that explicit protection of certain classes of 
individuals in the Constitution’s text excludes the extension of that protection to other 
classes of individuals not listed. For example, the Court held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Reduction-of-Representation Clause did not extend voting protection to 
women, since it explicitly listed “male inhabitants” of states. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 
(21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1873); id. at 174 (observing that its Reduction-of-Representation 
Clause reduces the federal representation of states that disfranchise male citizens 
twenty-one years of age and over, and asking “if suffrage was necessarily one of the 
absolute rights of citizenship, why . . . inflict the penalty for the exclusion of males 
alone?”). Similarly, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s exemption from 
sanction of states that disfranchise “male citizens twenty-one years of age and over, 
except for participation . . . in crime,” affirmatively sanctioned the exclusion of felons from 
the vote. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (“[T]he exclusion of felons from 
the vote has an affirmative sanction in § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 9 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217 (III), at art. 21 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to take 
part in the government of his country . . . .”); ANTHONY H. BIRCH, THE CONCEPTS AND 
THEORIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 93-94 (2d ed. 2001) (concluding that disputes in 
modern democratic states about whom should be represented have “now been 
resolved[, and that] . . . [i]t is now accepted everywhere, . . . that all adult citizens 
should be represented through the electoral system”). 
 10 A handful of theorists who do examine the voting age group all minors into 
a single homogenous category, discounting age-related distinctions among them. These 
theorists reach one of two conclusions. First, because minors are incompetent, their 
disfranchisement is legitimate. See, e.g., LUDVIG BECKMAN, THE FRONTIERS OF 
DEMOCRACY: THE RIGHT TO VOTE AND ITS LIMITS 119 (2009) (arguing in what may 
otherwise be the most sustained and comprehensive theoretical treatment of electoral 
exclusion, that “suffrage entails responsibilities that are not in the child’s best 
interests”); ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 126 (1989) (asserting that 
“[s]o far as I am aware, no one seriously contends that children should be full members 
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perhaps the only reasonable—proxy for the development-
related attainment of the capacities required for competent 
voting; (b) the setting of any voting age will inevitably involve 
some slippage (i.e., will exclude some individuals below the set 
voting age who will have nonetheless attained voting 
competence and include others who will not have attained such 
competence despite having reached the set voting age), but that 
is the nature of proxies, and of bright-line legal rules more 
generally;11 and (c) because age eighteen is a common proxy for 
legal competence generally, and there appears to be community 
consensus for this notion, eighteen seems to be as good a proxy 
for electoral competence as any.12 
This reasoning, while superficially plausible, suffers serious 
flaws that this article exposes and corrects. Here, I briefly highlight 
those flaws, as well as the core elements of my argument. 
First, this reasoning ignores the presumption of electoral 
inclusion to which persons subject to a democratic government’s 
authority are entitled. Presumptive inclusion is a broadly 
accepted normative commitment flowing from basic principles of 
democratic theory. While the presumption does not foreclose 
the possibility of legitimate exclusions, it does shift to the state 
the burden of justifying electoral exclusion.13 
Second, assessing whether a state has met its 
justificatory burden requires some principled criteria or 
  
of the demos that governs the state. An eight-year-old child can hardly be enlightened 
enough to participate equally with adults in deciding on laws to be enforced by the 
government of the state,” but failing to discuss older children or adolescents). Or, 
second, despite minors’ incompetence, their interests should be registered through the 
use of some proxy voting method. See, e.g., Olsson, supra note 2, at 55 (arguing that 
parents should be designated their children’s representatives for purposes of voting); 
Jane Rutherford, One Child, One Vote: Proxies for Parents, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1463, 1502 
(1998) (proposing that children’s interests can be registered by “creat[ing] proxies, so 
that their interests and voting power are expressed through others”). Two scholars, 
legal theorist David Archard and political theorist Francis Schrag, do consider age-
related differences among those younger than eighteen, although each author only 
briefly addresses the issue. See DAVID ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD 
103 (2d ed. 2004) (discussed infra note 295); Francis Schrag, Children and Democracy: 
Theory and Policy, 3 POL., PHIL. & ECON. 368-70 (2004) (discussed infra note 162). 
 11 See Paul Arshagouni, “But I’m an Adult Now . . . Sort of”: Adolescent 
Consent in Health Care Decision-Making and the Adolescent Brain, 9 J. HEALTH CARE 
L. & POL’Y 315, 333 n.110 (2006) (“Wherever one draws a bright line, there will 
inevitably be a certain number of individuals who in truth should have fallen on the 
other side of the line. Epidemiologically, these are known as false positives and false 
negatives. The greater the number of false positives and false negatives, the less 
usefulness we have for a given bright line rule.”). 
 12 In other words, some individuals younger than eighteen will have attained the 
relevant competence yet be denied the franchise, and other individuals who have reached 
eighteen but failed to attain the relevant competence will nonetheless be extended it. 
 13 See infra Part II.A. 
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standards for inclusion. Democracy theory and liberal 
constitutional principles have long supported two such criteria: 
ongoing interest in and connection to the political community 
and electoral decision-making competence.14 
Because no principled conception of electoral competence 
exists, I develop a concept of it here, informed by behavioral-
decision research on voter decision making and by research from 
various disciplines in the developmental sciences on adolescent 
cognitive development. I argue for a definition of electoral 
competence as the attainment and application of adultlike 
cognitive-processing capacities in the electoral context. These 
capacities include the abilities to acquire information and 
knowledge, to assess and process information, and to make and 
justify a decision.15 
And third, although age eighteen may have been the 
best available proxy for electoral competence when it became the 
national voting age in 1972, research in the developmental 
sciences in the intervening years lays the groundwork for a 
better-informed assessment of the attainment of voting 
competence. I survey research in behavioral and developmental 
psychology and in cognitive and social neuroscience. This 
research has expanded our understanding of the development of 
a full range of cognitive capacities. It establishes that adolescents 
reliably reach adultlike cognitive-processing capacities by ages 
fifteen or sixteen, but that numerous factors (e.g., situations 
involving high levels of emotion or stress, peer pressure, or time 
pressure) will predictably compromise their cognitive 
performance. Adolescent cognitive-processing competence is thus 
domain- or context-specific.16 
While scientific research cannot dictate policy, it can 
inform policy. Armed with more nuanced understandings of 
both voter decision making and the development of adolescent 
cognitive processing and decision making, I conclude that 
voting is the sort of decision-making context in which 
midadolescents will reliably demonstrate competence.17 In light 
of midadolescent electoral competence, states fail to meet their 
justificatory burden in the absence of other reasons for 
continued midadolescent electoral exclusion. 
  
 14 See infra Part II.B. 
 15 See infra Part III.A. 
 16 See infra Part III. 
 17 See infra Part III.B. 
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The article proceeds in three parts. Part I situates the 
U.S. voting age within a conceptual, historical, and modern 
global context. It first explains why the voting age in the 
United States was originally set at twenty-one. It goes on to 
document the lowering of the voting age to eighteen in the mid-
twentieth century. Finally, it describes and explains the 
growing global trend of lowering the voting age to sixteen. Part 
II identifies and justifies basic voting criteria. It argues that 
democratic principles require members of a political 
community to be presumptively entitled to political/electoral 
participation. Members may nonetheless be excluded from 
participating if they fail to possess certain characteristics—
namely, ongoing interest in and connection to the relevant 
community, and electoral competence. Part III argues for a 
conception of electoral competence informed by political- and 
behavioral-decision theorists’ understanding of voter decision 
making, and psychologists’ understanding of the cognitive 
processes required to competently make decisions in the 
electoral context. It then demonstrates that the converging 
research of developmental scientists in several disciplines 
provides new evidence of the age-related attainment of relevant 
cognitive processes. 
This article concludes that there is strong empirical 
evidence that the cognitive processes required for competent 
voting reliably mature by age sixteen. A reexamination of the 
voting age is necessary to account for the evolution of our 
understanding of electoral competence and its achievement. 
Only then can the modern democratic state ensure that the 
continued disfranchisement of a category of citizens remains 
consistent with its foundational political commitments. 
I. CONCEPTUAL, HISTORICAL, AND MODERN GLOBAL 
CONTEXT 
This part discusses the political and historical forces 
that initially set the U.S. voting age at twenty-one, the age of 
legal maturity in the English common-law tradition. The voting 
age remained unchanged in the United States for more than 
two centuries. Concerted efforts to lower it began in 1942, 
when Congress lowered the age of conscription from twenty-one 
to eighteen. Those efforts bore fruit in 1971, when a war that 
was especially unpopular with young people sparked a 
nationwide movement to lower the national voting age to 
eighteen. In the four decades since, the voting age has received 
1454 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:4 
essentially no attention domestically. It has, however, become 
an increasingly visible issue abroad, and a growing number of 
countries have lowered their voting ages from eighteen to 
sixteen or are considering doing so. This part concludes by 
surveying the contemporary global context and examining the 
factors that are driving this downward trend. 
A. England and the British Empire Through the 
Eighteenth Century 
The primary historical influence on early American 
voting rules was, unsurprisingly, the English common-law 
tradition. Arguments made during a series of important 
debates in mid-seventeenth-century England, both in favor of 
and against widespread suffrage, have echoed at voting rights 
debates ever since; they provide a conceptual framework for the 
discussion of democratic inclusion that follows in Part II. 
The age of majority has fluctuated throughout history. 
Under Roman law, the age of majority was fourteen for males, 
and twelve for females.18 The law presumed that by age 
fourteen, males would have attained the intellectual capacities 
necessary to exercise full citizenship, which required 
“understanding and judgment as to acts in law, in particular in 
relation to property rights.”19 In France, Germany, and 
throughout the northern parts of Europe between the ninth 
and eleventh centuries, the age of majority for males was 
fifteen.20 Though nearly identical to the Roman age of majority, 
the requisite capacities in northern Europe that signaled legal 
maturity were not intellectual but instead physical—namely, 
the physical ability to participate in warfare.21 
The age of majority for English knights, who fought on 
behalf of the crown, increased during the Middle Ages.22 Legal 
historians attribute the increased age requirement to the 
changing characteristics of war making. Armies increasingly 
included mounted cavalry, which required knights skilled in 
the use of horses in battle—skills that required a lengthy 
training period to develop. Along the same lines, improvements 
  
 18 T.E. James, The Age of Majority, 4 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 22, 23-24 (1960). 
 19 Id. at 25. 
 20 Id.  
 21 Id. (“The test applied in selecting this age seems to have been different 
from that applied in Rome[—]namely, the capacity to bear arms.”). 
 22 James observes that there is no “clear authority” that the English age of 
majority in the ninth and tenth centuries was fifteen, but concludes that it is a 
reasonable assumption. Id. at 26. 
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in defensive armor also increased the armor’s weight, requiring 
additional strength by those wearing it.23 Young men thus 
became eligible for knighthood at twenty-one, because not until 
then would they have completed the training and acquired the 
strength and endurance required of the armored warriors who 
fought in the heavy cavalry.24 
English suffrage originated in 1215, when English 
barons forced King John’s accession to the Magna Carta.25 
Initially the exclusive privilege of the English nobility, the 
franchise gradually expanded to other property owners.26 Early 
suffrage provisions imposed only residence and property 
(“freehold”) qualifications.27 Nothing explicitly restricted the 
franchise to males, or to people of a certain age; these 
restrictions were so sufficiently obvious that they remained 
unstated well into the nineteenth century.28 
English historical and common law traditions eventually 
became law throughout the British Commonwealth, and indeed 
in much of the Western world.29 However arbitrary its genesis 
may seem in retrospect, age twenty-one remained firmly 
entrenched as the age of legal and electoral majority for 
centuries in England, as well as in the nations across the globe 
that incorporated English traditions.30 
  
 23 Id. at 22-23, 30; see also WILLIAM ARTHUR SHAW, THE KNIGHTS OF 
ENGLAND: A COMPLETE RECORD FROM THE EARLIEST TIME TO THE PRESENT DAY OF THE 
KNIGHTS OF ALL THE ORDERS OF CHIVALRY IN ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, AND IRELAND, AND 
OF KNIGHTS BACHELORS, INCORPORATING A COMPLETE LIST OF KNIGHTS BACHELORS 
DUBBED IN IRELAND VOL. I ii-iii (1906), available at http://openlibrary.org/ 
books/OL7047747M/The_Knights_of_England. For “tenants in socage” (generally 
farmers who held land of feudal lords, to whom they owed rent), however, the age of 
majority remained fifteen (or sometimes fourteen). James, supra note 18, at 30. 
 24 James, supra note 18, at 28.  
 25 M.T. CLANCHY, ENGLAND AND ITS RULERS: 1066-1307, at 190-92 (3d ed. 2006). 
 26 Beginning in late fourteenth-century England, “franchise” referred to a 
political privilege or entitlement granted at the will of the governing body, who was the 
ultimate sovereign—“a special privilege or exclusive right to perform some public 
function, granted by a sovereign power to any person or body of people.” OXFORD ENG. 
DICTIONARY (2d ed. draft rev. 2010), available at http://www.oed.com/ (search 
“franchise”). A well-known 1430 English statute extended to “forty-shilling freeholders” 
the right to elect members to parliament’s House of Commons. DONALD GRIER 
STEPHENSON, JR., THE RIGHT TO VOTE: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES UNDER THE LAW 35-36 
(2004); CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY 
1760-1860, at 5-6 (1960). 
 27 The Reform Act of 1832 was the first English voter qualification statute 
that explicitly specified that the franchise extended only to “male person[s] of full age” 
who met other qualifications. WENDELL W. CULTICE, YOUTH’S BATTLE FOR THE BALLOT: 
A HISTORY OF VOTING AGE IN AMERICA 72 (1992). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 2. 
 30 James, supra note 18, at 22, 33. James characterizes the common law age 
of majority of twenty-one as “a curious development from the older systems requiring 
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1. Concepts of Electoral Inclusion: The Putney Debates 
The early franchise extended only to a tiny fraction of 
Englishmen. Following the end of the English Civil War in the 
mid-seventeenth century, soldiers who had fought in Oliver 
Cromwell’s victorious parliamentary army joined with political 
activists known as Levelers to demand equal (“level”) political 
rights.31 Among their then-radical demands were the 
elimination of the freehold requirement and the adoption of 
near-universal male suffrage.32 The group submitted a 
proposed “Agreement of the People” to Cromwell and other 
parliamentary officers, who then met with them in 1647 to 
discuss the proposal. The men held a series of meetings in 
Putney, near London, and their discussions were memorialized 
as what became known as the Putney Debates.33 
The debates frame modern concepts of political inclusion 
and justifiable limits to inclusion. The concerns underlying the 
moderates’ arguments for limited suffrage have helped justify 
and define modern boundaries of democratic inclusion; the 
Levelers’ arguments in favor of widespread suffrage echo, too, 
as the standard justifications for presumptive democratic 
inclusion and universal suffrage.34 
The more moderate spokesmen who defended narrow 
property-based suffrage made two basic arguments. First, 
because voters’ choices eventually shaped the laws that would 
bind everyone in the community, it was important for voters 
themselves to have “a permanent fixed interest in th[e] 
  
military service.” Id. at 33. Twentieth-century authors of a U.S. government report 
would later dismiss as “historical accident” the seemingly fortuitous connection 
between the physical strength needed to carry medieval armor and the minimum 
voting age. BIRCH EVAN BAYH, LOWERING THE VOTING AGE TO 18, S. DOC. NO. 92-96, at 
5 (1st Sess. 1971). 
 31 STEPHENSON, supra note 26, at 34. 
 32 Id. at 35. 
 33 Id. at 34-35. The Levelers’ commitment to political equality derived from 
their religious beliefs, but their public arguments aimed for broad, secular appeal. 
WILLIAMSON, supra note 26, at 64-65. 
 34 STEPHENSON, supra note 26, at 34-35 (“To one extent or another, every 
voting rights debate for more than 200 years afterwards echoed the debates at 
Putney.”). See generally BECKMAN, supra note 10, at 8 (recounting, more generally, 
arguments made in Britain against universal suffrage and noting that “the arguments 
employed in relation to contemporary exclusions owe much to the structure of the 
arguments of the past”); but cf. WILLIAMSON, supra note 10, at 64-68 (arguing that 
those who “have concluded that the Putney and other debates of this period represent 
the debut of modern democratic thought in Britain” overlook other democratic 
influences, such as the religious foundations of many early claims to political equality). 
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Kingdom . . . [and to] comprehend the local interest . . . .”35 A 
property-ownership requirement guaranteed that would-be 
voters possessed these characteristics. Property gave a man a 
personal stake in and knowledge of the community. The 
relatively permanent and ongoing nature of property 
ownership meant that the freeholder would himself be affected 
by and subject to the community’s laws, both current and 
future.36 The freeholder’s interests were thus linked to, if not 
identical with, those of the community, and he could be trusted 
by his fellow citizens to vote in a manner reasonably consistent 
with its interests—distinguishing him from transients who, 
lacking the rootedness that came with property ownership, 
could be “here today, and gone tomorrow.”37 
Second, only “men freed from dependence upon others” 
could be trusted to vote.38 The landless, servants, and women 
would too easily be influenced or manipulated by those they 
were economically dependent on.39 Economic independence 
alone could guarantee that persons’ votes would reflect 
intellectual independence.40 
The radicals who argued in favor of universal suffrage, 
on the other hand, tapped into the antimonarchical and 
growing egalitarian sentiments of the post-Civil War, pre-
Enlightenment years.41 They argued that all men equally 
possessed certain “natural rights” by virtue of their 
humanity—rights neither derived from, nor dependent on, the 
government or property ownership. “Has not the meanest He,” 
  
 35 STEPHENSON, supra note 26, at 36-37 (quoting Statement of Commissary 
General Henry Ireton, in 1 THE CLARKE PAPERS, NEW SERIES XLIX, 299-303 (C.H. 
Firth ed., 1891)). Ireton was Oliver Cromwell’s son-in-law and a senior military officer 
in the parliamentary army who led a moderate faction within the military. He was the 
primary author of the Declaration of the Army, which made more modest demands of 
Parliament. Id. at 34. 
 36 JACK R. POLE, PATHS TO THE AMERICAN PAST 245 (1979). 
 37 WILLIAMSON, supra note 26, at 64 (citing Statement of Commissary 
General Henry Ireton, in PURITANISM AND LIBERTY: BEING THE ARMY DEBATES (1647-9) 
FROM THE CLARKE MANUSCRIPTS WITH SUPPLEMENTARY DOCUMENTS 58 (A.S.P. 
Woodhouse, ed., 2d ed. 1951)). 
 38 KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 5 (quoting Statement of Commissary General 
Henry Ireton, in PURITANISM AND LIBERTY, supra note 37, at 82).  
 39 STEPHENSON, supra note 26, at 37 (quoting Statement of Colonel Rich, in 
THE CLARKE PAPERS, supra note 35, at 315) (arguing that in the Roman Republic, “the 
people’s voices were bought and sold, . . . and thence it came that he that was the 
richest man . . . made himself a perpetual dictator”). At a time when much voting was 
conducted viva voce—not by secret ballot—the economically vulnerable might 
understandably hesitate to cast a vote that would displease their economic superiors. 
Id. at 38-39, 47. At the time of the U.S. founding, voting in some locales, particularly in 
the South, continued to be an oral and public act. KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 23-24. 
 40 KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 38-39. 
 41 STEPHENSON, supra note 26, at 40; WILLIAMSON, supra note 26, at 62-67. 
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asked one of their leading spokesmen pointedly, “as much a life 
to live as the greatest He?”42 Men, regardless of station or 
education, were equally endowed with “human reason.”43 In light 
of their fundamental equality, no man could legitimately be 
made subject to the will of another without giving his consent, 
nor could a man legitimately be made subject to the laws of a 
government, unless he “first by his own consent . . . put himself 
under that Government.”44 Those “bound by laws in which they 
have no voice at all” are a people “enslave[d].”45 
The arguments made by the radical Levelers and their 
moderate counterparts were not original; indeed, many of the 
ideas that swirled at Putney could be traced to ancient 
thinkers.46 The considerable influence of the Putney Debates on 
American political thought more likely derived from two 
factors: first, the timing of the debates resulted in their 
dissemination throughout the American colonies in the decades 
preceding the American Revolution, as colonists increasingly 
chafed at their political inequality with respect to their mother 
country; second, the debates’ emergence out of Britain itself 
magnified their importance in the American colonies, given 
that colonists identified with the British or as British. The 
intellectual maelstrom of the period immediately following the 
English Civil War thus became the more “immediate origin[]” 
of American political thought and was “more instructive and 
influential in understanding” later American political 
developments than more historically distant antecedents.47 
2. The American Colonies 
The rhetoric at Putney had enduring influence but little 
immediate effect, either in England or in the American 
colonies. Instead, English law retained property and income 
qualifications for nearly three more centuries.48 The English 
  
 42 STEPHENSON, supra note 26, at 37-38 (quoting Statement of Colonel 
Thomas Rainborough, in THE CLARKE PAPERS, supra note 35, at 300-01, 304); 
WILLIAMSON, supra note 26, at 64 (quoting Statement of Colonel Thomas Rainborough, 
in PURITANISM AND LIBERTY, supra note 37, at 53). 
 43 WILLIAMSON, supra note 26, at 65. 
 44 STEPHENSON, supra note 26, at 38 (quoting Statement of Colonel Thomas 
Rainborough, in THE CLARKE PAPERS, supra note 35, at 299-303). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 33. 
 47 Id. 
 48 England expanded the franchise to include all men twenty-one and older 
who met a six-month residence requirement in the Reform Act of 1918. CULTICE, supra 
note 27, at 72. 
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age of legal and electoral majority would remain unchanged 
even longer—well into the twentieth century. 
When England established the thirteen American 
colonies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, it 
imposed on them no uniform voting rule.49 Each colonial 
assembly thus enacted voter qualification rules that would 
govern elections within its respective territory.50 Although the 
colonies’ rules varied, they all adopted property-based electoral 
systems that reflected prevailing British practice.51 They also 
retained twenty-one years as the near-universal age of electoral 
majority.52 An occasional and singular exception to general voter 
requirements was militia service, and some colonies occasionally 
enfranchised militiamen younger than twenty-one.53 This 
exception was in keeping with longstanding opinion (whose 
endurance seems to come more from its emotional appeal than 
its logical integrity) that those who risked their lives defending 
their country earned a voice in its governance.54 
B. United States, Through the Twentieth Century 
This section traces the political history of the U.S. 
voting age from the founding through the twentieth century. 
American revolutionaries echoed the Levelers’ claim that 
political membership was a birthright, and that voting was the 
fundamental political act. It was an ideology that made 
citizenship and suffrage inseparable.55 Just as the Levelers’ 
  
 49 STEPHENSON, supra note 26, at 41-47. 
 50 Id. at 41-45. “[W]ithin some colonies, some cities possessed charters issued 
by the Crown.” Id. at 42. In these cities, royal decree, not the colonial assembly, 
established the rules governing the franchise. Id. 
 51 Id. at 41. 
 52 CULTICE, supra note 27, at 2. Several colonies adopted rules allowing men 
who failed to meet certain qualifications to vote upon reaching an age higher than 
twenty-one. In Massachusetts and New Hampshire, for example, nonfreemen and those 
not members of the church could vote upon reaching age twenty-four. Id. at 4. 
 53 Id. at 2-3. The Virginia House of Burgesses in 1619, for example, 
pronounced that every male over sixteen was to serve in the militia, pay taxes, and 
vote. Id. at 3.  
 54 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 19 (2005); 
Amar noted that “[i]n classic republican theory, the rights of collective self-government 
stood shoulder to shoulder with the responsibilities of collective self-defense.” Id.; see 
also KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 36. More pragmatically, men denied the franchise might 
balk at the call to military service. Id. at 12-13; Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: 
The Exceptional History of the Right to Vote, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1345, 1348 (2003). 
 55 JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 45 
(1991) (arguing that the Putney “debates have a permanent significance, especially for 
American political thought,” and that “[t]he future American citizen was born in the 
course of these exchanges”). 
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ideas echoed in support of expanding the franchise, however, 
the opponents of widespread suffrage at Putney remained 
equally important to the political evolution of the nation. 
Political theorist Judith Shklar has noted that the moderates’ 
“arguments were repeated over and over again whenever yet 
another group of Americans demanded the right to vote.”56 
The Constitution submitted to the states for ratification 
contained no uniform national suffrage law.57 The Framers’ 
omission was intentional: not only were they themselves 
ideologically divided, but they also feared that any national 
suffrage law they proposed would generate sufficient controversy 
to derail ratification altogether.58 The states, as had the colonies 
before them, thus retained the power to determine voter-
qualification standards for both state and national elections,59 
and all retained twenty-one as the age of electoral majority.60 
The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified after the Civil War in 
1868, formally extended the benefits of citizenship to African 
Americans, and its Reduction-of-Representation Clause sought to 
secure their enfranchisement, albeit indirectly.61 It warned that a 
state disfranchising “any of the male inhabitants . . . being twenty-
one years of age, and citizens of the United States, . . . except for 
  
 56 Id.  
 57 KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 18. 
 58 Id. at 18-20. Alexander Hamilton explained, 
To have reduced the different qualifications in the different States to one 
uniform rule, would probably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the States, 
as it would have been difficult to the Convention. The provision made by the 
Convention appears, therefore, to be the best that lay within their option. It 
must be satisfactory to every State; because it is conformable to the standard 
already established, or which may be established by the State itself.  
THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 290 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898). 
 59 The Framers sought, however, to make the House of Representatives the 
federal legislative body most responsive to, and representative of, the common citizen. 
Article I thus provides that “the People of the several States” who meet “the 
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State 
Legislature” shall elect the members of the House. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. In this way, 
the Framers ensured that the most liberal electoral standard adopted by a given state 
would apply to state voters’ selection of their House delegates. 
  The Constitution also imposes age qualifications for various federal offices: 
twenty-five-years-old for the House, thirty for the Senate, and thirty-five for the 
presidency. Id. art. I, § 3 & art. II, § 1. Tench Coxe argued that the Constitution’s age 
requirements obligated the wealthy or politically connected individual, otherwise able 
to ascend to federal office at an early age, to first gain necessary experience and also to 
demonstrate “his merits to his country—a more rational ground of preference surely 
than mere property.” Tench Coxe, An Examination of the Constitution for the United 
States (II), in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 141 (Paul 
Leicester Ford ed., Da Capo ed. 1888) (1787-88). 
 60 CULTICE, supra note 27, at 12. 
 61 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1. 
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participation in rebellion, or other crime,” would lose 
representation in Congress and in the electoral college.62 The 
clause was interpreted as establishing something of a national 
voter-qualification norm, divesting the states of the power to 
disfranchise twenty-one-year-old male law-abiding citizens.63 
The voting age received no national attention to speak 
of until the United States entered World War II at the end of 
1941.64 Soon after declaring war, Congress began to debate 
amending the Selective Service and Training Act to lower the 
draft age from twenty-one to eighteen. As they debated that 
measure, legislators made another proposal—a constitutional 
amendment to lower the national voting age, also to eighteen.65 
Republican Arthur Vandenberg introduced the measure in the 
Senate, invoking again the idea that “if young men are to be 
drafted at 18 years of age to fight for their Government, they 
ought to be entitled to vote at eighteen years of age for the kind 
  
 62 Id.; see also Pamela S. Karlan, Unduly Partial: The Supreme Court and the 
Fourteenth Amendment in Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 587, 589-93 (2001) 
(discussing the Reduction-of-Representation Clause). 
 63 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 174-75 (1874) (relying on the 
clause’s explicit mention of “male” citizens to support its conclusion that the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not require extending the franchise to women). 
  Two years after ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment, the states ratified 
the Fifteenth, which sought to prevent the disfranchisement of newly freed African 
American men. The amendment states that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States 
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account 
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. It was 
hugely, but only briefly, successful. Nearly a million African American men voted, but 
once Union occupation of the South ended, southern states used a variety of legal and 
extralegal practices to again disfranchise African Americans. A whole range of barriers, 
both formal and informal, continued to limit the political participation of African 
Americans and others formally entitled to vote. Social and economic barriers such as 
poverty and illiteracy, as well as seemingly innocuous aspects of election 
administration (e.g., preregistration procedures, identification requirements at polling 
stations, choice of election day and hours) have presented, and continue to present, 
hurdles to political participation. DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS 28 (2002).  
  Over the following decades, activists sought both to enfranchise women 
and reenfranchise African American men. The passage of the Nineteenth Amendment 
in 1920 accomplished the former; U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; years of litigation and the 
passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 went a long way toward accomplishing the 
latter. THOMPSON, supra. 
 64 CULTICE, supra note 27, at 7, 13-14. The first “serious” consideration given 
to a proposal to lower a statewide voting age from twenty-one to eighteen probably 
occurred at the Missouri Convention in 1820. Id. at 7. After the end of the Civil War, 
delegates to the New York Constitutional Convention of 1867 considered a similar 
proposal; both conventions rejected the proposals. Id. at 7, 13-14. 
 65 Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg, from Michigan, and Democratic 
Congressman Jennings Randolph, from West Virginia, introduced joint resolutions 
proposing the constitutional amendment. S.J. Res. 166, 77th Cong. (1942); H.R.J. Res. 
354, 77th Cong. (1942). 
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of government for which they are best satisfied to fight.”66 
Congress lowered the draft age to eighteen in the fall of 1942 but 
adjourned without taking action on the proposed amendment.67 
Between 1942 and 1944, members of Congress 
introduced more than a half-dozen similar joint resolutions to 
lower the national voting age;68 in the states, lawmakers began 
doing the same.69 Georgia became the first state to lower its 
statewide voting age to eighteen, amending its constitution in 
1943, just one year after eighteen-year-olds became eligible for 
the draft.70 Between 1945 and 1952, state lawmakers 
introduced nearly 100 bills in their legislatures proposing 
reductions in the voting age, and federal lawmakers sent more 
than a dozen bills to congressional committees.71 It was more 
than ten years after Georgia’s constitutional amendment, 
however, before any other proposals would succeed. Then, in 
1955, Kentucky became the second state to lower its voting 
age.72 When new states Alaska and Hawaii adopted their 
constitutions soon thereafter, they adopted compromise voting 
ages of nineteen and twenty, respectively.73 
Unlike earlier movements to enfranchise African 
American and women citizens, the disfranchised—young people 
themselves—were not at the forefront of the youth-vote 
movement. The nation’s youth did not begin to mobilize until 
the early 1960s, when the nation’s involvement in the Vietnam 
War galvanized their efforts.74 Student organizations on college 
  
 66 88 CONG. REC. 8316 (1942) (statement of Sen. Arthur Vandenberg); 88 
CONG. REC. 8507 (statement of Rep. Jennings Randolph). 
 67 CULTICE, supra note 27, at 22. 
 68 Id. at 20, 22. 
 69 Id. at 24-25. 
 70 Id. at 25-26. 
 71 Id. at 30. 
 72 Id. at 55. In 1954, President Dwight Eisenhower, a former military 
general, became the first U.S. president to endorse a constitutional amendment 
extending the vote in federal elections to eighteen-year-olds. Eisenhower’s reasoning 
was to the point: “[I]f a man is old enough to fight he is old enough to vote . . . .” 
KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 225.  
 73 CULTICE, supra note 27, at 59-60. 
 74 See Lowering the Voting Age to 18: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Constitutional Amendments of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 23 (1968) 
(statement of Rep. Spencer Oliver). As of 1968, approximately 25 percent of U.S. 
troops, and nearly 30 percent of U.S. casualties, had been younger than twenty-one 
years old. Id. In 1968, students founded Let Us Vote (LUV) on the campus of the 
University of the Pacific in Stockton, California. Within months, the organization 
expanded to include chapters at more than three thousand high schools and four 
hundred colleges across the country. CULTICE, supra note 27, at 97-98. LUV joined the 
Youth Franchise Coalition, comprising twenty-three civil rights and educational 
organizations working to extend voting rights, both at the state level and through a 
federal constitutional amendment. Id. at 98. 
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campuses and in high schools then joined various civil-rights 
organizations already working to extend voting rights to 
eighteen-year-olds.75 
In an effort to bypass the cumbersome process of 
amending the U.S. Constitution, Congress in 1970 moved to 
lower the nationwide voting age through federal legislation.76 
Lawmakers, before voting to extend the Voting Rights Act, 
which was set to expire, inserted into the Act a provision 
lowering the voting age to eighteen in both federal and state 
elections. President Richard Nixon, who explained that he 
supported a lower voting age not because eighteen-year-olds 
were old enough to fight, but because “they were smart enough 
to vote,” signed the amended Act into law.77 As he did so, 
however, Nixon expressed skepticism that Congress’s power 
extended beyond regulating federal elections to also include 
setting voter qualifications for statewide elections.78 
Nixon’s skepticism was well-founded, and four states 
immediately challenged the law.79 The case Oregon v. Mitchell 
split the Supreme Court.80 Four justices would have held that 
Congress was without power to set voter qualifications for 
either federal or state elections.81 Four justices would have held 
that Congress had power to set voter qualifications for both 
federal and state elections.82 Justice Hugo Black, the swing 
vote, believed that Congress had the power to set voter 
qualifications in federal—but not state—elections.83 His 
plurality opinion, upholding the provision in part and 
invalidating it in part, became the judgment of the Court.84 
  
 75 CULTICE, supra note 27, at 99. 
 76 The amendment extended the Voting Rights Act and, in addition to its 
provision lowering the voting age, abolished residency requirements over thirty days 
for national elections and prohibited literacy tests for a period of five years. Voting 
Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314. 
 77 CULTICE, supra note 27, at 115. 
 78 The Voting Rights Act was set to expire if Congress failed to pass the 
amendments extending it. Unwilling to allow that to happen, Nixon signed the 
amendment, indicating that he was “leaving the decision on the disputed provision to 
what I hope will be a swift resolution by the courts.” Id. at 139. 
 79 The states were Arizona, Idaho, Oregon, and Texas. See Oregon v. 
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 112 (1970). 
 80 The justices filed five separate opinions in the case. Id. at 115. 
 81 They were Justices Blackmun, Harlan, and Stewart, and Chief Justice 
Burger. See id. at 152 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 281 
(Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 82 They were Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and White. See id. at 229 
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 135 (Douglas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 83 Id. at 117. 
 84 Id.; see also CULTICE, supra note 27, at 172-73. 
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Oregon v. Mitchell thus left intact the provision in the 
Voting Rights Act lowering the voting age to eighteen in federal 
elections, but by invalidating the same provision’s application 
to the states, returned the voting ages for statewide elections to 
their respective pre-1970 status quo. The forty-seven states 
that did not permit eighteen-year-olds to vote scrambled either 
to modify their voting systems to accommodate two voting 
lists—one for federal elections and another for state elections—
or to change their laws to lower the voting age in both federal 
and state elections.85 Modifying state voting systems presented 
significant administrative challenges and promised to be 
expensive.86 Lowering the voting age statewide required 
amending state constitutions, and in every state but Delaware, 
constitutional amendments required voter referenda.87 Because 
of the requirements of their constitutional amendment 
processes, only fifteen states could possibly have changed their 
statewide voting ages in time for the November 1972 
elections.88 
Spurred by the prospect of election-day chaos, in March 
1971 Congress hurriedly approved the proposed Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment.89 The amendment provided that the right of 
citizens “eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of age.”90 The state legislatures all met in session or 
special session to ratify the amendment, and they did so in 
record time. The Twenty-Sixth Amendment became law—in 
time for the 1972 elections—when Ohio became the thirty-
eighth state to ratify it in June 1971.91 
Significantly, World War II did not spark the voting-age 
debate in the United States alone: it ignited a “global suffrage 
age reduction movement.”92 By the early 1970s, the world was 
nearly evenly divided; sixty-nine countries had voting ages of 
twenty-one or older, while sixty-eight countries had adopted 
  
 85 CULTICE, supra note 27, at 180-81. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 185. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 191. 
 90 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1. 
 91 CULTICE, supra note 27, at 191. 
 92 After lowering the age of conscription, U.S. allies also confronted pressures 
to enfranchise their youngest soldiers; several did so, at least temporarily. Id. at 78. 
During both world wars, for example, Britain, Canada, and several other 
Commonwealth members lowered the wartime voting age from twenty-one to nineteen, 
restoring their voting ages to twenty-one after the wars. Id. at 76. In 1936, Russia 
became the first European nation to permanently lower its voting age to eighteen. Id. 
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voting ages of less than twenty-one (with fifty-two of those 
adopting eighteen as the national voting age).93 
C. Global Context, into the Twenty-First Century 
This section surveys the continuing expansion of the 
franchise to younger citizens in other countries, and the status 
of the voting age in the United States. More than a dozen 
countries have lowered local, state, or national voting ages to 
sixteen, driven primarily by efforts to increase youths’ political 
engagement and counter the disproportionate political influence 
of older citizens (who vote at higher rates than the young, and 
whose numbers have grown as a result of demographic factors). 
Other nations have begun to consider doing the same. In the 
United States, a handful of state legislatures have considered 
proposals to lower statewide voting ages, but the issue has not 
generated widespread attention. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the average 
age of the electoral majority worldwide was just under twenty-
four years.94 Approximately half of Europe’s nations (including 
Britain, France, and Italy) set the age of electoral majority at 
twenty-one, and half at an older age.95 
Today, most nations have adopted some form of 
representative democratic government.96 Over 80 percent have 
set the voting age at eighteen without exception.97 Twelve 
countries extend the franchise to sixteen-year-olds, although 
two do so only for those who are employed, and three only for 
those who are married.98 Five countries have set the voting age 
  
 93 Id. at 79. More than a dozen of the countries that retained twenty-one as 
the voting age allowed individuals younger than twenty-one to vote under certain 
circumstances—e.g., those serving in the military, those who were married, or those 
participating in provincial or local elections. Id. at 78-79. 
 94 Id. at 76. 
 95 Id. The original nineteenth-century constitutions of more than a dozen 
European nations, for example, set the age of electoral majority at twenty-five years; 
several other nations set it at thirty. Id. at 89.  
 96 Of 195 independent countries, 117 qualified as “electoral democracies” in 
2011, according to a widely cited annual survey conducted by Freedom House, an 
independent watchdog organization. FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2012: 
THE ARAB UPRISINGS AND THEIR GLOBAL REPERCUSSIONS 29, available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/FIW%202012%20Booklet
--Final.pdf.  
 97 See The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2123.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
 98 Countries permitting sixteen-year-olds to vote include Austria, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Brazil, Croatia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guernsey, 
Indonesia, Isle of Man, Jersey, Nicaragua, and Slovenia. Id. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, and Slovenia permit only employed sixteen-year-olds to vote; otherwise, the 
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at seventeen.99 The average voting age worldwide is between 
seventeen and eighteen years.100 
In Western democracies and the Commonwealth nations, 
countries that have lowered or are considering lowering the 
voting age are doing so to counteract the aging of their 
electorates and to increase more generally the political 
participation of young people. These continue to be the nations 
with which the United States is most closely aligned politically, 
and I discuss them at greater length below. 
1. Canada and Australia 
Canadian political parties all allow members as young 
as fourteen to vote for the parties’ candidates for Canadian 
prime minister.101 The national voting age for all other 
elections, however, is eighteen.102 
Over the last decade, the Canadian Parliament has 
considered numerous proposals to lower the national voting age 
to sixteen, the most recent coming before the House of 
Commons in 2005.103 The bill’s supporters advanced their 
proposal as an instrumental measure that would reverse 
declining voter participation and reengage youth in the nation’s 
politics.104 Members of Parliament from each of the four federal 
  
voting age is eighteen. Id.; Danish Youth Council, DUF Factsheet: The Suffrage Age—
in Europe 2 (Jan. 2011), http://duf.dk/uploads/tx_templavoila/Suffrage_in_Europe.pdf. 
The Dominican Republic and Indonesia permit married individuals regardless of age to 
vote; otherwise the voting age is eighteen in the Dominican Republic and seventeen in 
Indonesia. The World Factbook, supra note 97. Hungary allows married individuals 
aged sixteen or seventeen to vote. Danish Youth Council, supra, at 2. In Sweden and 
Finland, sixteen-year-olds may vote in parochial church council elections. Id. at 1; see 
also BRAZIL: A COUNTRY STUDY 300-01 (Rex A. Hudson ed., 1997), available at 
http://countrystudies.us/brazil/. 
 99 Countries permitting seventeen-years-olds to vote include Indonesia, North 
Korea, Seychelles, Sudan, and Timor-Leste. The World Factbook, supra note 97.  
 100 See generally The World Factbook, supra note 97 (listing most nations’ 
voting ages between seventeen and nineteen). 
 101 House of Commons Debates (Hansard), No. 47 (Feb. 1, 2005), at 1735 
(Can.), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/House/381/Debates/047/HAN047-
E.PDF (statement of Private Member Mark Holland on Canada Elections Act) (“We 
give youth the opportunity at leadership conventions to select the leaders of our 
respective parties, who become prime ministers. That certainly is something that we 
all think is acceptable. In fact, in all of our nominations youth as young as 14 are 
allowed to select who their local candidate will be.”). 
 102 The World Factbook, supra note 97. 
 103 Press Release, House of Commons, All-Party Team Pushes for Youth 
Voting Rights (Dec. 14, 2004), available at http://www.epsb.ca/board/march22_05/ 
item07.pdf. 
 104 See House of Commons Debates (Hansard), No. 47, supra note 101, at 1730 
(statement of Private Member Mark Holland on Canada Elections Act). Holland, who 
sponsored the bill, suggested that because younger people lack the vote, legislators 
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political parties, including the caucus leaders of each party, 
joined in multipartisan support of the proposal, but the bill 
failed to pass the House.105 
The Australian federal government, also with the goal of 
increasing voter engagement and participation, raised the 
possibility of lowering the national voting age to sixteen in a 
2009 green paper.106 As of this writing, however, the proposal 
has not advanced further in the lawmaking process. 
Like the United States, Australia is a federal democracy, 
and its six states retain power over state voting rules. The 
  
ignore them and their issues, which contributes to their disengagement. He argued 
that “[b]y the time they get to 18, . . . they are often disengaged and they are not in a 
general education environment any more. Their patterns have already been 
established.” Id. Younger adolescents still in school could join a political party, 
participate in debates, and engage with legislators and candidates for office in a 
meaningful way. Because they still live at home (as opposed to high-school graduates 
who have gone to college or moved out of their parents’ home), it would be easier for 
them to register and actually vote. Early voting and political engagement will 
potentially establish a lifetime pattern; Holland claimed that “if we can get them to 
vote once they will vote again and again.” Id. 
 105 An Act to Amend the Canada Elections Act (Voter and Candidate Age), Bill C-
261, 38th Parl. (Can. 2004), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/ 
Publication.aspx?DocId=2333564&Language=E&Mode=1. The House of Commons rejected 
the bill on June 5, 2005. House of Commons Debates (Hansard), No. 111 (June 8, 2005) at 
1915 (Can.) available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/House/381/Debates/ 
047/HAN047-E.PDF (voting down the bill in a division of the house); see also Press 
Release, House of Commons, All-Party Team Pushes for Youth Voting Rights (Dec. 14, 
2004), available at http://tools.bcweb.net/images/85b55e52596ed161adfc246c839071ca/ 
14dec04_release_voting_age.pdf; House of Commons, Arguments for Bill C-261: Bill aims 
to reverse declining voter participation by involving youth early (Dec. 14, 2004), available 
at http://tools.bcweb.net/images/85b55e52596ed161adfc246c839071ca/14dec04_release_ 
voting_age.pdf. Several years earlier, a Canadian sixteen-year-old and seventeen-year-old 
challenged their disfranchisement as unconstitutional. An Edmonton federal court rejected 
their claim, upholding the restriction as a reasonable legislative balance between 
safeguarding the fundamental right to vote and ensuring sufficient maturity to do so. 
Fitzgerald v. Alberta, 2002 ABQB 1086 (Can.). 
 106 Austrl. Gov’t, Electoral Reform Green Paper: Strengthening Australia’s 
Democracy (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.dpmc.gov.au/consultation/ 
elect_reform/strengthening_democracy/docs/strengthening_australias_democracy.pdf. 
The stated purpose of the Green Paper was “to encourage public debate about options 
for improving and modernising Australia’s electoral system.” Id. at 5; see also Sue 
Neales, Move to Lower Voting Age, MERCURY (Hobart, Austl.) (Sept. 23, 2009, 1:01 PM), 
http://www.themercury.com.au/article/2009/09/23/99171_tasmania-news.html; Emma 
Rodgers, Proposal to Lower Voting Age to 16, ABC NEWS (Sept. 24, 2009, 8:08 AM), 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/09/23/2694432.htm. 
  The Australian Green Party, one of the nation’s five significant political parties, 
supports lowering the voting age to sixteen. See MARK RODRIGUES & DIANE SPOONER, PARL. 
OF AUSTRL., BILLS DIGEST: ELECTORAL AND REFERENDUM AMENDMENT (MODERNISATION 
AND OTHER MEASURES) BILL 2010 (JUNE 24, 2010), available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/bd/2009-10/10bd191.pdf. Another political 
party, the Australian Democrats, have recently urged the state of South Australia to lower 
its voting age to sixteen. The Democrats have little presence in the national Parliament, 
though. Democrats Urge S.A. to Lower Voting Age, AGE (Austl.) (Apr. 14, 2008), 
http://news.theage.com.au/national/democrats-urge-sa-to-lower-voting-age-20080414-
25ys.html. 
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Victorian Electoral Commission (VEC), which manages state 
and local elections in the state of Victoria and also conducts 
electoral research, published a study of the age of electoral 
majority in a 2004 research paper.107 The VEC concluded that 
research conducted both in the United Kingdom and in Germany 
suggested that many of the arguments for excluding sixteen- 
and seventeen-year-olds from the franchise “might not be 
valid.”108 It then noted numerous advantages to lowering the 
voting age. Foremost among them, the VEC noted that “lowering 
the voting age to an age when people are still in school would 
allow more effective education programmes due to them being 
more relevant to students’ immediate lives,” and thus potentially 
“reduce voter ignorance overall.”109 Consistent with reported 
studies, the research paper suggested that participating in 
elections at a young age could establish lifelong participatory 
habits and reduce the likelihood of apathy at later ages.110 The 
VEC concluded that “democracy will be enhanced by the 
inclusion of additional viewpoints.”111 
2. Continental Europe 
A growing number of Western European nations have 
either lowered their voting ages or are considering doing so. In 
general, supporters of the change view it as a policy instrument 
to increase youth political representation and civic 
engagement, counterbalance the overrepresentation of older 
voters among the electorate (caused by the higher turnout of 
older voters and the aging of the population), and improve 
democracy more generally. 
In 2009, a group comprising members of Parliament from 
nine European countries proposed that the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe study whether to 
“lower[] . . . the voting age to sixteen in all [forty-seven] member 
  
 107 CHRISTOPHER GRIBBIN, VICTORIAN ELECTORAL COMM’N, LOWERING THE 
VOTING AGE: A DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES FROM THE VICTORIAN ELECTORAL 
COMMISSION’S PERSPECTIVE (2004), available at http://www.vec.vic.gov.au/files/RP-
LoweringtheVotingAge.pdf. 
 108 Id. at 10. 
 109 Id. at 10-11. 
 110 Id. at 11. The VEC reasoned that if voter involvement begins “when people 
are young and enthusiastic, . . . fewer young people may develop an attitude of 
‘politicians don’t care about me’ which continues into later life.” Id.  
 111 Id. Among the initiatives advanced by a Youth Summit held in 2008 was a 
proposal to lower the voting age to sixteen. Susanna Dunkerley, Youth Speak: Make the 
Voting Age 16, ADVERTISER (Austl.), Apr. 14, 2008, at 7, available at 2008 WLNR 6923734. 
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countries . . . .”112 The proposal expressed the signers’ concern 
over current low voting rates among young voters across 
Western Europe and observed that the aging of the population 
would only worsen youths’ marginalization in political processes. 
It argued that the trends threatened “the future stability of 
European democracy,” and that lowering the voting age could 
help reengage young people in the democratic process.113 
Austria lowered its national voting age to sixteen by 
constitutional amendment in 2007, becoming the first 
European Union nation to do so.114 In large part, the change 
sought to counterbalance the increasing percentage of voters 
aged sixty-five and older, whose numbers have been growing 
due to declining birth rates. Because individuals under 
eighteen could not vote at all, and because older citizens vote at 
rates higher than do younger citizens, the growing 
demographic imbalance prompted concerns that government 
would become less responsive to the interests of the nation’s 
young people. Sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds voted for the 
first time in the 2008 national elections.115 Although the 
Austrian government does not track voter participation by age, 
one government-funded study found that sixteen- to eighteen-
year-olds voted in the 2008 national elections at the same rate 
as the rest of electorate—approximately 73 percent.116 
Several states in Switzerland and Germany have 
lowered the voting age for local elections to sixteen; nearly half 
of the sixteen German states have done so. In Norway, the 
ombudsman for children has published a report advocating 
  
 112 Expansion of Democracy by Lowering the Voting Age to 16, PARL. EUR. 
DOC. (COM 11895) ¶ 8 (2009), available at http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/ 
WorkingDocs/Doc09/EDOC11895.pdf (as presented by Denmark Parl. Mem. Mogens 
Jensen et al., May 4, 2009). The group that presented the proposal included members 
of Parliament from Austria, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, 
Turkey, Ukraine, and the U.K. Id. 
 113 Id. ¶ 5. 
 114 Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz [B-VG] [Constitution] BGBl No. 1/1930, as last 
amended by Bundesgesetzblatt [BG] BGBl I No. 27/2007, art. 26, ¶ 1 (Austria); Franz 
Fallend, Austria, 47 EUR. J. POL. RES. 902, 907 (2008); World Briefing Europe: Austria: 
Voting Age Lowered to 16, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2007), http://query.nytimes.com/ 
gst/fullpage.html?res=9501E4DC1E30F935A35755C0A9619C8B63. 
 115 Austria, in a First, Allows Children to Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/25/world/europe/25iht-austria.4.16485539.html.  
 116 ULRIKE KOZELUH, SORA INST. FOR SOC. RES. & ANALYSIS, POST ELECTION 
STUDY—VOTING WITH 16: MAIN RESULTS FOR THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN AUSTRIA 
2008 (English-language Summary 2009), available at http://www.sora.at/fileadmin/ 
downloads/wahlen/2009_waehlen-mit-16_summary-english.pdf. 
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lowering the national voting age to sixteen.117 As a pilot project, 
the Norwegian Parliament has authorized twenty 
municipalities to enfranchise sixteen-year-olds in municipal 
and county elections in 2011.118 Finland, too, has recently 
appointed a government group to study the issue.119 
3. The British Islands 
In the British Islands, the self-governing Crown 
dependencies—the Isle of Man and the Bailiwicks of Guernsey 
and Jersey—lowered their voting ages from eighteen to sixteen 
in 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively.120 In both Scotland and 
Wales, Parliamentary Assemblies voted in 2008 in favor of 
lowering the voting age to sixteen.121 Neither is currently able 
to implement the change, however, since the authority to 
establish voter qualifications, even for local elections, rests with 
the central U.K. Parliament in Westminster.122 The Scottish 
Parliament has called on Westminster to transfer to Scotland 
the legislative and executive power needed to effectuate a 
change in the voting age.123 It passed legislation in 2009 to lower 
  
 117 REIDAR HJERMANN, WHAT’S THE POINT?: A BOOKLET ON THE RIGHT TO 
VOTE FOR 16-YEAR-OLDS 2-3, 11 (2010), available at http://www.barneombudet.no/ 
sfiles/0/82/9/file/bo_stemmerett_english_web.pdf. 
 118 Id.  
 119 See, e.g., Voting Age May Be Lowered to 16 in Finnish Municipal Elections, 
HELSINKI TIMES (June 8, 2010, 11:18 AM), http://www.helsinkitimes.fi/htimes2/ 
domestic-news/politics/11365. 
 120 Island’s Voting Age Lowered to 16, BBC NEWS (Feb. 7, 2006, 1:07 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/isle_of_man/4690678.stm.  
 121 Robbie Dinwoodie, SNP in Move to Lower Voting Age to 16: Change in Law 
Required, HERALD (Glasgow, Scot.), June 13, 2008, at 7, available at 2008 WLNR 11182161 
(detailing how Scotland lowered the voting age to sixteen); Record of Plenary Proceedings, 
NAT’L ASSEMBLY FOR WALES (Feb. 6, 2008), http://www.assemblywales.org/bus-home/bus-
chamber/bus-chamber-third-assembly-rop.htm?act=dis&id=81636&ds=2/2008 (approving 
by a vote of 44–4 a motion stating “that the National Assembly for Wales . . . [b]elieves 
that in order to engage young people in the democratic process, 16-year-olds should be 
entitled to vote”); AMs Call to Lower Voting Age, WALESONLINE (Feb. 6, 2008), 
http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/2008/02/06/ams-cal-to-lower-voting-age-
91466-20440924/. 
 122 Dinwoodie, supra note 121. The U.K. Parliament has devolved designated 
powers to the governments of Scotland and Wales, retaining others. See Which 
Responsibilities are Devolved?, CABINET OFFICE, http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ 
content/which-responsibilities-are-devolved (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). The power to set 
electoral rules is among those retained by the U.K. Parliament in Westminster. See 
Dinwoodie, supra note 121; see also Voting at 16, WELSH NAT’L ASSEMBLY, 
http://exploretheassembly.org/lang/en-uk/get-involved/elections-etholiadau/voting-at-16 
(last visited Sept. 4, 2010) (acknowledging that, despite the Welsh National Assembly’s 
vote in favor of lowering the voting age, “deciding on the age of voting isn’t one of the 
Devolved Fields, so it is down to Westminster to decide”). 
 123 Press Release, Scottish Government, Voting Powers (Dec. 6, 2008), available 
at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2008/06/12104807 (quoting Scottish 
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the voting age to sixteen in pilot health board elections, and the 
pro-independence Scottish government permitted sixteen- and 
seventeen-year-olds to vote in a referendum on Scottish 
independence in 2010.124 
In Westminster, members of Parliament’s House of 
Commons have introduced four bills to lower the voting age in 
the last six years, suffering defeats by increasingly narrow 
margins.125 Former British Prime Ministers Tony Blair and 
Gordon Brown both announced their support while in office for 
lowering the voting age.126 
In 2002, the Electoral Commission, an independent 
commission charged by the British Parliament to review public 
election law and policy, began a review of minimum voting and 
  
Minister for Parliamentary Business Bruce Crawford as “call[ing] upon the UK 
Government to transfer responsibility for the electoral franchise to the Scottish 
Parliament”); see also Dinwoodie, supra note 121; David Maddox, SNP Demands Power to 
Cut Voting Age to 16, SCOTSMAN (Edinburgh, Scot.), June 13, 2008, at 12, available at 
2008 WLNR 11165896. 
 124 Health Boards (Membership and Elections) (Scot.) Act, 2009 (A.S.P. 5), § 2, 
sched. 9(1), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/legislation/scotland/acts2009/pdf/asp_ 
20090005_en.pdf; Tom Peterkin, Referendum Voting Age to Be Cut to 16, SCOT. ON SUNDAY, 
Sept. 20, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 18588698; Bid to Lower Referendum Vote 
Age, BBC NEWS (Sept. 19, 2009, 5:12 PM), http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/8264446.stm. 
 125 Tory Lord Lucas of Crudwell introduced a bill in 2003, and Liberal 
Democrat Stephen Williams, Labour Party’s Julie Morgan, and Liberal Democrat Jo 
Swinson introduced bills in 2005, 2007, and 2009. See Early Day Motion 1472, 2008-09, 
H.C. (May 12, 2009), available at http://www.parliament.uk/edm/2008-09/1472 (2009 
Bill); Voting Age (Reduction) Bill, 2007-08, H.C. Bill [54/3] (Gr. Brit.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmbills/022/08022.1-i.html (2007 
Bill); Early Day Motion 801, 2005-06, H.C. (Oct. 19, 2005), available at 
http://www.parliament.uk/edm/2005-06/801 (2005 Bill); Greg Hurst, Ministers 
Contemplate Cut in Voting Age to 16, TIMES (London), Feb. 14, 2003, available at 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article876843.ece (2003 Bill). The House 
defeated the 2005 bill introduced by Liberal Democrat Stephen Williams by a margin of 
eight votes. 440 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005) 141 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo051129/debtext/5112
9-07.htm (voting down Bill 136-128). 
 126 Brown urged the House of Commons to consider the issue in a 2007 speech 
on constitutional reform. 462 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2007) 819 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070703/debtext/7070
3-0004.htm (statement of P.M. Gordon Brown). After an independent commission studied 
the issue but found insufficient cause for change, Brown noted that the commission 
“couldn’t make up its mind, so it’s come back to us. I personally would like to see the 
voting age reduced to 16.” Tomos Livingstone, I’d Like to See the Voting Age Lowered to 
16, Says Brown, WESTERN MAIL (Wales), July 24, 2009, available at 
http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/2009/07/24/i-d-like-to-see-the-voting-age-
lowered-to-16-says-brown-91466-24228229/; see also Andrew Grice, Blair Will Give Vote 
to 16-Year-olds, INDEP. (London), May 4, 2004, at 1, available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/blair-will-give-vote-to-16-yearolds-
562185.html; Joanna Moorhead, Sweet 16: Would You Give the Vote to Them?, INDEP. ON 
SUNDAY (London), May 9, 2004, (Features), at 16-17, available at 2004 WLNR 10422645. 
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candidacy ages.127 The commission undertook its review in 
response to declining election turnouts, noting that the citizens 
least likely to vote in the United Kingdom are the youngest 
group of eligible voters—eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds.128 
Its review followed those of independent commissions from 
England, Scotland, and Wales that had all recommended 
lowering the voting and candidacy ages as a way of increasing 
young people’s interest and participation in government.129 
The commission reached five major conclusions.130 First, 
while the fact that a clear majority of countries have a voting 
age of eighteen does not conclusively preclude the adoption of a 
lower age in the United Kingdom, it does shift the burden of 
persuasion to those seeking the change.131 Second, the age at 
which young people attain various legal rights and 
responsibilities varies; therefore, while this information is useful, 
the nation should assess the age of electoral majority in its own 
context.132 Third, there is no consensus on the definition of 
“maturity” and “what it means in relation to electoral 
participation and minimum voting and candidacy ages.”133 Fourth, 
in research the commission conducted, young people reported that 
they did not vote primarily because they were insufficiently 
informed; the commission also noted that citizenship education 
was only in its infancy in the U.K.134 And finally, while the 
majority of direct respondents to the commission’s public 
consultation paper favored a reduction of the voting age to 
sixteen, the general public favored retaining the current age of 
  
 127 THE ELECTORAL COMM’N, AGE OF ELECTORAL MAJORITY: REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (2004) [hereinafter U.K. ELECTORAL COMM’N 2004 REPORT], 
available at http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/63749/ 
Age-of-electoral-majority.pdf. 
 128 Id. at 7. 
 129 Id. at 8 (citing the reports of commissions in England, Scotland, and Wales 
that had made such recommendations in reports published in 2002). In a paper 
published in 2003 reporting its research and seeking public comment, the commission 
also noted that the Human Rights Commission in Northern Ireland also recommended 
a reduction in the voting age, to seventeen. THE ELECTORAL COMM’N, HOW OLD IS OLD 
ENOUGH?: THE MINIMUM AGE OF VOTING AND CANDIDACY IN UK ELECTIONS 29 (2003). 
  A coalition of organizations in the U.K. launched Votes at 16 in January 2003. 
Coalition membership includes political parties and a range of organizations concerned 
with democracy and young people. See Alex Folkes, The Case for Votes at 16, 41 
REPRESENTATION 52 (2004); VOTES AT 16 COALITION, 16 FOR 16: 16 REASONS FOR VOTES AT 
16 (2008), available at http://www.electoral-reform-scotland.org.uk/downloads/16for16.pdf; 
VOTES AT 16 COALITION, http://www.votesat16.org.uk (last visited Jan. 27, 2012). 
 130 U.K. ELECTORAL COMM’N 2004 REPORT, supra note 127, at 59-62. 
 131 Id. at 59. 
 132 Id. at 59-60. 
 133 Id. at 60. 
 134 Id. 
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eighteen, and there was “no significant or even consistent 
majority of young people calling for the right to vote . . . .”135 
The commission concluded that “there does not seem to 
exist a sufficiently strong argument that change now would affect 
the level of political engagement between young people and the 
political process,” and looking for “clear evidence on which to base 
any change in the current voting age, . . . [the commission] to date 
has found insufficient justification for such change.”136 
The commission planned to revisit the issue again in 
2010 or 2011, and said that two factors in particular could 
“change the social context to a sufficient degree to make a 
lower voting age appropriate in the future.”137 The first factor 
was the continued development of citizenship education across 
the United Kingdom (public schools had only recently 
introduced a new citizenship-education program).138 The second 
factor was whether there was any change in public opinion 
regarding the preferred general age of majority.139 At the time 
of this writing, the commission has not yet revisited the issue. 
The Labour Party in 2008 submitted to Parliament a bill to 
lower the voting age to sixteen for all U.K. elections. Although 
the bill garnered some support from other parties, opponents 
successfully blocked its progression through Parliament.140 
4. The United States 
The voting age everywhere in the United States is 
eighteen, although nineteen states permit seventeen-year-olds to 
vote in primaries if they will turn eighteen in time for the 
general election.141 Nothing suggests imminent change. A 
number of state legislatures in recent years have considered—
and rejected—occasional bills or proposed constitutional 
  
 135 Id. at 61. 
 136 Id.  
 137 Id. at 62. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 New Bid to Lower the Voting Age to 16-year-olds Is Blocked, BIRMINGHAM 
POST (U.K.), June 7, 2008, at 4, available at 2008 WLNR 10745322. 
 141 See 17-year-old Primary Voting Fact Sheet, FAIR VOTE: CTR. FOR VOTING & 
DEMOCRACY, http://www.fairvote.org/17-year-old-primary-voting-fact-sheet (last visited 
Apr. 17, 2012) (listing Alaska, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, 
Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oregon, Virginia, Vermont, and Washington as allowing seventeen-year-olds to 
vote in primaries or caucuses under state law). Most recently, the Maryland legislature 
in its 2010 session passed a provision permitting persons younger than eighteen to vote 
in certain primary elections. 2010 Md. Laws ch. 271. 
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amendments that would lower state or local voting ages.142 The 
Massachusetts legislature has not yet voted on a proposal to 
lower the voting age to seventeen, but in 2009, three of the four 
Democratic U.S. Senate candidates in Massachusetts supported 
the measure.143 A proposal that would permit sixteen-year-olds 
to vote in limited circumstances, such as for school-district 
elections, is also pending before the Michigan legislature.144 
II. PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRATIC ELECTORAL INCLUSION 
Voter qualification rules determine the categories of 
individuals included in and excluded from an electorate. This 
part looks to democratic and liberal theories to identify standards 
for establishing these rules and assessing their legitimacy. 
Part II.A introduces the principle of presumptive 
inclusion, advanced by democracy theorists and widely 
accepted as a foundational normative commitment of 
democratic states. Presumptive inclusion places on the state 
the burden of justifying electoral exclusions. 
  
 142 States that have considered proposals to lower the voting age are Arizona 
(2001, 2002, 2008, and 2009 proposals to lower age to sixteen); California (2004 
proposal to lower voting age to fourteen, with votes of fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds 
counting for one-quarter vote, and votes of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds counting 
for one-half vote); Hawaii (2004 proposals to lower voting age to sixteen and 
seventeen); Illinois (2008 and 2010 proposals to lower voting age to seventeen); Iowa 
(2004 and 2008 proposals to lower voting age to seventeen in school-district elections); 
Michigan (2004 proposal to lower voting age to seventeen, in addition to 2008 proposals 
to lower voting age to sixteen for all elections, and for school-district elections); 
Minnesota (2002, 2004, and 2009-2010 proposals to lower the voting age to sixteen or 
seventeen); Texas (2001 and 2003 proposals to lower voting age to fourteen); 
Washington (2006 and 2008 proposals to lower voting age to sixteen); and Wisconsin 
(2009-2010 proposal to lower voting age to seventeen). See Election Reform Legislation, 
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS., http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/2001-
2010-database-of-election-reform-legislation.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).  
 143 3 of 4 Democrats Running for Ted Kennedy’s Senate Seat Say They Support 
Lowering Federal Voting Age, MASSLIVE.COM (Nov. 30, 2009, 2:00 PM), 
http://blog.masslive.com/breakingnews/print.html?entry=/2009/11/3_of_4_democrats_run
ning_for_t.html. The candidates who expressed support for lowering the statewide voting 
age were Martha Coakley, Alan Khazei, and Stephen Pagliuca. Id. Martha Coakley won 
the Democratic primary but lost the election to Republican candidate Scott Brown. See 
Matt Viser & Andrea Estes, Big Win for Brown: Republican Trounces Coakley for Senate, 
Imperils Obama Health Plan, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 20, 2010, at 1, available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/01/20/republican_trounces
_coakley_for_senate_imperils_obama_health_plan/. In 2002, the Massachusetts 
legislature placed under indefinite study a bill approved by the Cambridge City Council 
lowering the local voting age to seventeen. The state legislature’s approval was required 
to enact the bill. Ricarose Roque, Voting Age Bill Stuck in State Legislature, TECH, Oct. 
18, 2002, at 1, 28, available at http://tech.mit.edu/V122/PDF/N48.pdf. 
 144 See S.J. Res. B, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2009), available at 
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2009-2010/jointresolutionintroduced/Senate/ 
pdf/2009-SIJR-B.pdf. 
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Inclusion in democratic/electoral processes is presumptive, 
but it is not absolute. Part II.B examines democratic exclusions 
and the conditions that render them justifiable. It evaluates 
longstanding standards that have generally required, for 
inclusion in the electorate, both (1) ongoing connection to the 
community and (2) vote decision-making competence. Individuals 
lacking these characteristics (or indicia of them) are commonly 
excluded from political participation. 
While these standards for inclusion (or some variation 
of them) have long enjoyed near-universal acceptance, few 
democracy theorists have sought to justify them. In other 
words, the basic standards for inclusion have widespread 
intuitive appeal and seem correct, but it has been difficult to 
say why they are correct. 
I advance a new argument that the twin standards for 
inclusion can derive, not solely from democratic principles, but 
also from the foundational commitment to individual liberty of 
the liberal constitutional democratic state. 
Part III turns to the standard that is of central relevance 
here—electoral decision-making competence. This section first 
develops a conception of electoral competence, since none 
currently exists, and next assesses the age range by which 
young would-be voters have reliably attained that competence. 
A. Presumptive Electoral Inclusion 
There are many conceptions of democracy, and each has 
normative implications for the democratic legitimacy of a given 
political system.145 Assessing the nature of political inclusion 
required for democratic legitimacy thus first requires a 
conception of democracy itself. The conception advanced below is 
a fairly typical one that describes the minimum requirements for 
a democratic system—i.e., the type of political participation 
required to render a process democratic, and the scope of 
political inclusion required to render a community democratic. 
  
 145 See, e.g., DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 2006) (cataloguing and 
discussing conceptions of democracy, including classical Athenian democracy, deliberative 
democracy, and the cosmopolitan model); David Collier & Steven Levitsky, Democracy 
with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research, 49 WORLD POL. 430, 450 
(1997) (surveying conceptions of democracy). Some theorists view democracy as an 
inherently ambiguous and contestable concept. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE 
TERMS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 10 (Princeton Univ. Press 2d ed. 1983) (1974). 
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1. Defining Democratic Inclusion and Democratic 
Participation 
A typical account of democracy provides that, in order 
for a political system to qualify as democratic, the people subject 
to its laws must collectively authorize them.146 A democratic 
government thus derives its authority from the “the people” 
who are the individual members of the political community. 
Although minimalist, this normative account supplies a 
particular conception of “the people” who are entitled to 
political participation,147 and it implies a conception of political 
participation itself. 
Under this account, the people are the legal subjects of a 
government.148 This conception is narrower than that advocated 
  
 146 Although this is a fairly conventional conception of democracy, this 
formulation draws directly from the nearly identical definitions of political philosopher 
David Estlund and political theorist Albert Weale. For Estlund, “[d]emocracy [is] the 
authorization of laws collectively by the people who are subject to them [and] is 
inseparable from voting.” DAVID M. ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK 66 (2008). Weale’s formulation of democratic legitimacy is 
that a government must, at a minimum, guarantee that “important public decisions on 
questions of law and policy [will] depend, directly or indirectly, upon public opinion 
formally expressed by citizens of the community, the vast bulk of whom have equal 
political rights.” ALBERT WEALE, DEMOCRACY 18 (2d ed. 2007). 
  Political theorist Iris Marion Young is among those who articulate a 
conception that is decidedly more robust, embracing a “minimalist understanding of 
democracy . . . [in which] democratic politics entails a rule of law, promotion of civil and 
political liberties, [and] free and fair election of lawmakers.” IRIS MARION YOUNG, 
INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 5 (2000). 
  Political scientist and economist Joseph Schumpeter has famously adopted 
what remains an atypical conception of the minimum requirements for a democratic 
political system. To Schumpeter, democracy exists so long as there is widespread 
political competition. He argues against “defin[ing] democracy by the extent of the 
franchise.” JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 276 n.16 
(Taylor & Francis e-Library 2003) (1943). He thus denies the centrality to democratic 
systems of a widespread franchise, decrying what he terms the “classic[al] doctrine of 
democracy.” Id. Schumpeter believes that typical voters lack sufficient political 
knowledge to make reliable decisions, denies the possibility of a “uniquely determined 
common good,” id. at 251, and argues that the expression of a public opinion “from the 
infinitely complex jumble of individual and group-wise . . . volitions . . . of the ‘democratic 
process,’ . . . lacks not only rational unity but also rational sanction.” Id. at 253. 
 147 Political theorists refer to the question of “what persons have a rightful 
claim to be included in the demos” as the “problem of inclusion.” ROBERT A. DAHL, 
DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS. CONTROL 98 (1982) [hereinafter 
DAHL, DILEMMAS]; see also DAHL, supra note 10, at 119. See generally BECKMAN, supra 
note 10, at 10-15 (discussing various aspects of the “problem of inclusion”).  
 148 See, e.g., ESTLUND, supra note 146, at 66 (defining the people entitled to 
authorize laws as “collectively[,] the people who are subject to them”). Weale defines it 
as “the vast bulk of . . . citizens of the community,” where “citizen” appears to refer to 
the legal dimension of citizenship. Weale acknowledges that citizenship is not always a 
necessary condition for securing political rights such as the franchise, but he observes 
that “it is invariably the principal basis.” WEALE, supra note 146, at 208; see also 
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by some theorists, who argue that “the people” should include 
“[e]veryone who is affected by the decisions of a government 
[and who] should [thus] have the right to participate in that 
government.”149 The broader conception is the more inclusive of 
the two, but also the less useful. Because there are innumerable 
ways in which governments’ decisions affect people, the scope of 
the affected by conception is difficult to delimit. And since causal 
connections cross national borders, species membership, and 
time, the conception’s implementation (i.e., the method by which 
the preferences of geographically scattered or remote persons, 
other species, future generations, et cetera, would be identified 
and registered) poses nearly insurmountable challenges.150 The 
narrower, legal conception of “the people” delimits the notion of 
“affected” by extending rights of participation only to those 
individuals who are legal subjects “bound by” or “subject to the 
government and its laws.”151 The scope of government’s 
authority to directly regulate an individual’s behavior or status 
thus bounds the relevant conception of “affected.”152 
This account of democracy also requires “the people” to 
authorize the laws that govern them. Members of a political 
community can participate in and influence government’s 
decisions in any number of ways.153 Voting is one method, but 
others include political demonstrations, participatory town 
  
MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 62 
(1983) (“[T]he denial of [citizenship] is always the first of a long train of abuses.”). 
 149 ROBERT A. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION: AUTHORITY IN A GOOD SOCIETY 
64 (1970) [hereinafter DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION] (emphasis added); DAHL, supra 
note 10, at 119-20. Dahl concludes, however, that the broad form of the principle is 
unhelpful, as it offers a “diffuse galaxy of uncountable possibilities.” DAHL, AFTER THE 
REVOLUTION, supra, at 66.  
 150 Robin Eckersley, Deliberative Democracy, Ecological Representation and 
Risk: Towards a Democracy of the Affected, in DEMOCRATIC INNOVATION: 
DELIBERATION, REPRESENTATION AND ASSOCIATION 119 (M. Saward ed., 2000) (arguing 
that democratic inclusion should extend to anyone, “irrespective of social class, 
geographic location, nationality, generation, or species”); Robert E. Goodin, 
Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives, 35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 35, 55 
(2007) (concluding that the all-affected principle, if taken to its logical conclusion, 
would justify extending political participation to “[v]irtually . . . everyone in the 
world—and indeed everyone in all possible future worlds”). 
 151 DAHL, supra note 10, at 123.  
 152 The legal conception of the all-affected principle is consistent with the goal 
of “symmetry” espoused by some modern theorists who argue that democracies should 
aspire to achieve symmetry between those entitled to participate in a decision and 
those bound by it. HELD, supra note 145, at 290. The idea of democratic symmetry 
echoes the Aristotelian conception of a democratic system as one where “all rule each 
and each rule all.” ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS § 1370a (T.A. Sinclair trans., London, 
Penguin Books 1981). 
 153 See generally BIRCH, supra note 9, at 159-69 (presenting a typology of 
political power). 
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meetings or deliberation, canvassing, community or Internet 
organizing, letter/op-ed writing, et cetera.154 Whatever the 
relative merits or efficacy of other forms of political activity, 
pragmatic and equitable concerns generally require eventual 
resort to a model that registers the collective will as the 
aggregation of individuals’ preferences, as expressed through 
their vote decisions. Participatory or deliberative processes, for 
example, may aim to achieve consensus of some sort, but they 
are also apt to result in continued disagreement (even when 
numbers do not make such deliberation impractical). Voting 
provides a method for reaching legitimate, collectively binding 
decisions by registering and weighing equally individuals’ 
expressed preferences.155 Voting has thus long been the primary 
means by which “the people” authorize the laws—sometimes 
directly, by voting on policy questions, but more commonly 
indirectly, by electing legislators.156 
  
 154 Id. at 105 (listing “the main forms of political participation”). Civil society 
theorists have argued more generally that widespread citizen participation in a range 
of organizations and associations—not only political associations, but also churches, 
athletic clubs, etc.—contributes to democracies’ flourishing. See generally ROBERT D. 
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 
(2000). The deliberative model of democracy places at the core of democratic processes 
not voting, but instead reasoned public deliberation aimed at achieving rational 
consensus. See, e.g., Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE 
GOOD POLITY 17, 22 (Alan Hamlin & Phillip Pettit eds., 1989) (arguing that political 
decisions are legitimate “if and only if they could be the object of free and reasoned 
agreement among equals”); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 32 (William Rehg, 
trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992) (arguing that political legitimacy requires “the 
‘concurring and united will of all’ free and equal citizens”). 
 155 See, e.g., ROBERT E. GOODIN, REFLECTIVE DEMOCRACY 12, 227 (2003) 
(acknowledging that processes of deliberation will likely end in a vote and observing 
that aggregation is not intrinsically bad, but instead what is objectionable about a 
merely aggregative model is the “mechanistic meat-grinder aspect of the aggregation of 
votes into collective decisions”). James Fishkin has argued in favor of methods that 
integrate the deliberative model into representative democracy. JAMES S. FISHKIN, 
DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM 1 (1991). 
Fishkin is perhaps best known for advocating “deliberative” polling, a form of opinion 
poll in which a small but representative group of citizens gathers, receives briefing 
materials on a specific issue (policies, candidates, etc.), deliberates, and is then polled. 
The polling and their deliberations are publicly broadcast. The process aims to reveal 
what public opinion would be on a given issue, were the public well-informed and 
engaged. Id. at 81; see also JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC 
OPINION AND DEMOCRACY (1995). 
 156 Both Goodin and Fishkin allow that representation, “direct or indirect” or 
by “authorizing” laws, does not delegitimize democracy. See supra note 155. Not all 
democratic theorists agree. Radical democrats, for example, treat direct democracy as 
normative and tend to view political representation as inconsistent with democratic 
values, because it “impairs the community’s ability to function as a regulating 
instrument of justice . . . .” BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY 
POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 145-46 (1984). These ideas echo Rousseau’s account of 
unmediated popular rule, which required that citizens assemble and decide law and 
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I thus adopt from democratic theory and advance here the 
(quite modest) normative premise that a democratic government 
derives its authority from the individuals governed by it—i.e., the 
individuals subject to and bound by its laws. Those individuals 
are the legal subjects of the political system and thus members of 
the political community. They are “the people” who must 
collectively authorize the laws in order for that government to 
claim democratic legitimacy. Correspondingly, an individual’s 
status as a legal subject of the government, and thus a member 
of the political community and one of “the people,” presumptively 
entitles the individual to participate in the governance of a 
democratic system. This is what I will call the democratic 
principle of presumptive inclusion. 
The next sections first develop the normative implications 
of the principle of presumptive inclusion, and then they explore 
its boundaries. Every political system excludes some individual 
members of “the people” from the most basic form of political 
participation—electoral participation.157 The “demos,” which 
comprises those persons within a given community entitled to 
political participation through the franchise,158 never includes 
all of “the people.” I explore whether and when democratic 
exclusion is legitimate, then make the new argument that 
liberal democratic theory can provide justification for the 
exclusion from the demos of certain categories of “the people.” 
2. Implications: Presumptive Inclusion and the Burden 
of Justifying Exclusion 
The previous section argued that the individual 
members of a political community—“the people”—have 
presumptive claims to inclusion in the demos. Presumptive 
inclusion, however, neither mandates electoral participation 
nor precludes the possibility of legitimate exclusions. In a 
democratic process, the aggregation of individuals’ votes 
  
public policy in furtherance of the common good, without the mediation of political 
representatives. Robert A. Nisbet, Rousseau and Totalitarianism, 5 J. Politics 93, 102-
03 (1943) (“‘When the people, having been adequately informed, hold its deliberation, 
and the citizens have had no communication among themselves, the whole number of 
individual opinions will always result in the General Will, and the decision will always 
be just.’” (quoting JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT bk. 2, ch. 3)). 
 157 See infra notes 166-92 and accompanying text. 
 158 More broadly, the term demos can indicate the members of a populace, but I 
use its narrower construction, in which it refers to people within a given community 
entitled to political participation through the franchise. Demos Definition, OXFORD ENG. 
DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/49859 (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
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determines the collective preference.159 But aggregated votes 
will accurately reflect collective community preference so long 
as some critical mass of the people—sufficiently representative 
of the whole—participate. Because the number of voters is 
typically large, the aggregation of votes will accurately reflect 
the collective preference even without the actual participation 
of every member of the community. Democratic legitimacy thus 
requires widespread electoral inclusion, but it survives 
tolerable levels of nonvoting and does not foreclose the 
possibility of some legitimate exclusion. 
Their presumed inclusion entitles legal subjects to political 
participation through the franchise, absent some legitimate 
reason160 for treating them unequally by excluding them from it.161 
Would-be voters subject to a government’s authority thus ought 
not bear the burden of demonstrating that they merit full political 
participation. To the contrary—the state bears the burden of 
demonstrating the legitimacy of its exclusion.162 
The report of the U.K. Electoral Commission described 
above is a recent and explicit example of official failure to 
assimilate the principle of presumptive inclusion.163 The 
commission’s report almost certainly represents the most 
comprehensive and balanced examination of the voting age to 
be conducted by any public entity to date. Yet, the commission 
  
 159 But see, for example, YOUNG, supra note 146, at 6, for a sustained 
argument that “voting equality is only a minimal condition of political equality,” and 
arguing for “additional and deeper conditions of political inclusion and exclusion, such 
as those involving modes of communication, attending to social difference, 
representation, civic organizing, and the borders of political jurisdictions;” see also 
Susan E. Clarke, Splintering Citizenship and the Prospects for Democratic Inclusion, in 
THE POLITICS OF DEMOCRATIC INCLUSION 210, 211-13 (Christina Wolbrecht & Rodney 
E. Hero eds., 2005) (“[I]nclusive citizenship encompasses opportunities for collective 
problem solving and deliberation.”). 
 160 What some of these legitimate reasons might be is the subject of Parts 
II.B.1 and II.B.2, infra. 
 161 Elizabeth Fraser, Democracy, Citizenship and Gender, in DEMOCRATIC 
THEORY TODAY: CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 75 (April Carter & Geoffrey 
Stokes eds., 2002) (“Democracy . . . has progressively come to imply the rightness of 
universal suffrage . . . . So, any barriers to participation, or any exclusions, have 
explicitly to be justified.”). 
 162 Part II.B, infra, discusses criteria for inclusion. Francis Schrag argues 
broadly that contemporary democratic theorists who argue for universal suffrage 
cannot adequately account for the exclusion of children. He thus argues for a system of 
universal suffrage in which the voting age would be lowered “substantially,” and where 
younger children’s interests would be represented either by a proxy vote exercised by 
their parents, or by an appointed “Guardian” who would represent the interests of all 
children. Schrag, supra note 10, at 376. 
 163 See supra notes 127-39 and accompanying text; see also Part I.C.3.  
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presumed the legitimacy of youth exclusion.164 Observing that 
most countries currently retain a voting age of eighteen, the 
report explicitly shifted the burden of persuasion to those 
seeking to change the status quo by lowering the voting age to 
sixteen.165 In other words, the commission has imposed on 
proponents of the enfranchisement of sixteen- and seventeen-
year-olds the burden of demonstrating their entitlement to 
political inclusion. In so doing, it relieved the state of the 
obligation of justifying its exclusion. Presumptive inclusion 
requires the reverse: the burden rests firmly with the state to 
justify voter qualifications that operate to exclude any category 
of persons subject to its authority.166 
B. The Boundaries of Electoral Inclusion 
The previous section argued that the state bears the 
burden of justifying electoral exclusions. At the same time, no 
demos is fully inclusive, and every democracy has adopted voter 
qualification rules that exclude some members of the community 
from electoral participation. In this section, I first describe the two 
basic voting criteria that electoral qualification rules typically—
  
 164 Presumptive electoral inclusion embodies the norm of universal suffrage. I 
avoid using the term universal suffrage, however, because, as conventionally used, it 
describes an electoral system that imposes reasonable restrictions on the franchise, not 
one that is literally universal. Scholars routinely claim that nearly all of the world’s 
nations are democracies, and that all democracies now provide for universal suffrage, 
although no democratic nation allows everyone to participate in elections. See, e.g., 
TATU VANHANEN, DEMOCRATIZATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 170 COUNTRIES 65 
(2003) (concluding that more than 85 percent of all countries “provided for universal 
suffrage”); see also BECKMAN, supra note 10, at 2; DAHL, DILEMMAS, supra note 147, at 
97; KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at xxvi (“[T]he United States was one of the last countries in 
the developed world to attain universal suffrage.”); L. MASSICOTTE ET AL., 
ESTABLISHING THE RULES OF THE GAME: ELECTIONS LAWS IN DEMOCRACIES 26 (2004). 
  The use of universal suffrage to refer to what is actually less-than-
universal suffrage is widely enough understood that it does not result in confusion, but 
it is an error nonetheless. It subtly infuses a normative judgment—that certain 
exclusions from the franchise are justifiable and thus ought not count as democratic 
deficits—into what purports to be a descriptive term (“universal suffrage”). Doing so 
risks an elision of both the fact and significance of exclusion. Decisions about whom to 
include and exclude from political participation require normative arguments. A 
political system should turn to normative principles to explain why a certain exclusion 
from the franchise is a justified exclusion; it should not simply redefine exclusions—
just because they happen to be common—as nonexclusions. 
 165 U.K. ELECTORAL COMM’N 2004 REPORT, supra note 127, at 59. 
 166 I reiterate here that this is not a constitutional analysis of voter 
qualifications. It is instead a normative analysis of the obligations of the liberal 
democratic state, grounded in political and democracy theory. Were the analysis 
grounded in the obligations imposed on the federal and state governments by the U.S. 
Constitution, it would be necessary to consider at some length the standard to which 
the state would be held in order to satisfy its burden of justifying its rules. 
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and legitimately—aim to ensure. I then propose a new justification 
of these criteria grounded in liberal democratic theory. 
1. Identifying Criteria for Electoral Inclusion: Interest 
and Competence 
Few political theorists explicitly address the basic 
voting criteria (e.g., connection to, or interest in, a given 
political community) that explain and may legitimize specific 
electoral exclusionary rules (e.g., rules excluding nonresidents 
from the franchise, because they will presumably lack this 
connection or interest).167 Theorists have tended more generally 
to argue in the political liberal tradition that distinctions made 
between groups of individuals, in order to be just, must be 
reasonable and consistent with norms of equal treatment.168 
Identifying and justifying the basic criteria that all 
voters should satisfy, however, are important endeavors. 
Criteria can serve as a useful standard, both for establishing 
voter qualification rules and against which to evaluate the 
legitimacy of existing rules.169 
Those theorists and activists who have sought to 
identify basic voting criteria have reached near consensus, 
even across the centuries.170 Most have designated criteria that 
exclude from the demos individuals who lack (1) a significant 
  
 167 THOMPSON, supra note 63, at 20 (“[T]he electoral process should provide 
citizens with equal opportunities to have their votes equally counted, unless respectful 
reasons justify unequal treatment. The reasons are respectful if they could be mutually 
accepted by free and equal citizens.”); see also BECKMAN, supra note 10, at 12; Donald 
W. Rogers, Introduction: The Right to Vote in American History, in VOTING AND THE 
SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 3 (Donald W. Rogers ed., 1992). 
 168 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 273-74 (1977). 
 169 DAHL, DILEMMAS, supra note 147, at 98 (concluding simply that there is “no 
definitive answer” to questions involving which criteria, if met, would establish the 
legitimacy of any given exclusion); see also BECKMAN, supra note 10, at 9 (suggesting 
that the reluctance of political scientists to undertake the task might be due to its “not 
be[ing] perceived as interesting enough or because the issue has been associated with 
seemingly intractable normative and conceptual muddles”). Beckman argues for a set 
of criteria, consistent with the liberal tradition, in the recently published Frontiers of 
Democracy. Id. at 8. Beckman applies his criteria to common voting rules 
disfranchising criminals, noncitizens, and minors. Id. He does not, however, apply his 
criteria to minors of different ages. See id. 
 170 Beckman groups existing voter qualifications as requiring “competence, 
belonging [in the relevant community], and independence.” BECKMAN, supra note 10, at 
8. Weale argues that the franchise may be limited to those with a commitment through 
a “nexus” to the community “rooted in the circumstances of the lives of individuals.” 
WEALE, supra note 146, at 215. He argues generally that “[t]he general principles of 
interest, qualification and commitment through a nexus to the community therefore 
provide a basis for the allocation of the franchise.” Id. at 217. Youths’ lack of 
qualification, or competence, Weale concludes, is “[t]he sole ground for excluding 
children from the vote.” Id. at 214. 
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and ongoing connection to the community and (2) vote decision-
making competence.171 
While basic voting criteria have largely remained 
constant, notions of reliable indicia of them reflected in specific 
voter qualification rules have changed significantly. For 
example, the seventeenth-century moderates at Putney sought 
to ensure that voters would cast their ballots in a manner 
consistent with community interests, and believed that only 
voters with a “permanent and fixed” interest in the community 
and its future would reliably vote in this way.172 To them, 
property ownership was the best indicator that a potential voter 
possessed the requisite interest.173 Today, not property 
ownership but instead citizenship, residence, and law-
abidingness qualifications all seek to ensure the same criteria—
ongoing community interest and connection. Next, the Putney 
moderates sought to ensure that voters would vote in a manner 
that reflected independent intellectual judgment. To them, 
intellectual independence could not exist in the absence of 
economic independence. Dependent voters, they reasoned, might 
be unwilling to vote in a way that accurately reflected their best 
independent judgment if doing so risked displeasing those to 
whom they were economically beholden. Today’s voting rules do 
not inextricably link economic and intellectual 
independence/judgment. But to the same end, states have 
adopted voter qualification rules that allow the 
disfranchisement of adults deemed mentally incompetent. The 
voting age, however, is the primary voter qualification rule 
whose aim is to ensure that voters have developed the requisite 
intellectual independence and decision-making competence.  
The next subsection briefly examines the justifications 
for these two basic voting criteria. 
  
 171 See supra Part I.A.1 (recounting arguments made at the seventeenth-
century Putney Debates). Two centuries after the Putney Debates, John Stuart Mill 
advocated these same basic standards for inclusion—interest in community and 
decision-making competence. To ensure that voters had the requisite competence and 
to improve the quality of voting generally, Mill (somewhat infamously) proposed 
literacy and mathematical tests as voting criteria, as well as the allocation of 
additional votes to those with higher levels of education. John Stuart Mill, 
Considerations on Representative Government, in JOHN STUART MILL: ON LIBERTY AND 
OTHER ESSAYS 329-31 (J. Gray ed., 1991) (1861). 
 172 See supra Part I.A.1.  
 173 See supra Part I.A.1. 
1484 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:4 
2. Criteria for Electoral Inclusion in the Liberal 
Constitutional Democracy: A Noninstrumental 
Justification 
To the extent that democracy implies absolute majority 
rule,174 no nation is—nor aspires to be—fully democratic.175 A 
system’s commitment to the democratic principle of popular 
rule coexists with, and is tempered by, other commitments. The 
United States is a liberal constitutional federal democracy. The 
democratic principle requires that those subject to a 
government’s authority collectively authorize its laws.176 But 
constitutionalism restrains popular sovereignty, limits the 
power of government, and establishes procedures for legitimate 
rulemaking;177 and, pursuant to constitutionalism, federalism 
aims to achieve an optimal balance between local and 
centralized governance. The nation’s foundational value and 
core political commitment, however—and that which 
undergirds the others—is individual liberty.178 
  
 174 The etymological origin of democracy is the Greek demokratia, or “popular 
government” (combining demos, “the commons” or “the people,” and kratos, “rule” or 
“authority”). Democracy definition, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.oed.com/ 
view/Entry/49755 (last visited July 28, 2012). 
 175 ROBERT A. DAHL, ON POLITICAL EQUALITY 7 (2006). Dahl explains that an 
“ideal” can serve two purposes—one empirical, one moral—and that the two are often 
confused. Although the “democratic ideal” may describe a system that is in some sense 
perfect, the function of “ideal” here is strictly definitional or descriptive. It does not 
necessarily follow that the more perfectly democratic, the better. The ideal system is 
not necessarily the best system. It may be, but deciding that the ideal is desirable is 
distinct from defining what the ideal is. The former is a normative judgment; the latter 
a descriptive definition. Id. 
 176 For a discussion of more participatory or republican democratic models (in 
which the electorate participates in making policy decisions) and more protective ones 
(in which the primary function of democracy is to protect individuals’ liberty by 
constraining the power of government), see David Miller, The Competitive Model of 
Democracy, in DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND PRACTICE 133 (G. Duncan ed., 1983). 
 177 Constitutionalism thus ensures that our individual and collective “better 
selves” will constrain our “more impulsive selves”—an instrument for “the people sober 
to keep in check the people drunk.” Karol Edward Sołtan, Introduction to CITIZEN 
COMPETENCE AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 6 (Stephen L. Elkin & Karol Edward 
Sołtan eds., 1999). 
 178 Liberalism is the broad political philosophy that served as the nation’s 
founding principle—“that all men are created equal,” that among their inalienable 
rights are the rights to “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness,” and that 
government is instituted “to secure these rights, . . . deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed . . . .” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
The Constitution’s Preamble declares the document’s purpose to include “secur[ing] the 
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity . . . .” U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
  Political theorist Stephen Macedo describes as a “truism” the idea that the 
liberal tradition is the foundation of the nation’s political identity. STEPHEN MACEDO, 
LIBERAL VIRTUES 5-6 (1990). For a discussion of individual liberty as the nation’s core 
value, see Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature Citizens and the State, 2010 BYU L. REV. 
1055, 1068-75. 
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Classical liberals consider individual liberty to be the 
central value of the liberal state,179 whereas modern liberals 
consider it part of a more complex core aimed at ensuring that 
“[e]ach person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of 
equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme 
of liberties for all.”180 Individual liberty is a core value for 
classical and modern liberals alike, however, and is thus a least 
common denominator of sorts.181  
While individual liberty is the nation’s core value, 
different conceptions exist of what that liberty itself entails.182 
The thinnest of these is negative liberty—freedom as 
noninterference.183 Negative liberty permits a person to define 
and pursue his or her ultimate life course. And, as I have 
argued elsewhere, if liberty is the state’s core value, then 
safeguarding individuals’ liberty must be its primary end.184 
Basic, life-deciding liberty is thus the minimum entitlement of 
individuals in the liberal state.185 
The complement of the individual’s basic life-deciding 
liberty is the absence in every other person of a liberty to 
decide that individual’s life course.186 Each person thus has a 
claim, or right, to have the state withhold from all other 
persons—popular or majority wishes notwithstanding—the 
right to be “other-determining.”187 This restraining function is 
one of the core purposes of constitutionalism and the 
institutional arrangements through which it limits popular and 
governmental power. 
  
 179 See, e.g., F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 257-58 (1960). 
 180 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 291 (expanded ed. 2005). 
 181 Hamilton, supra note 178, at 1169-70. 
 182 Three conceptions of individual liberty are most prominent—negative 
liberty, positive liberty, and republican liberty. For a brief description of each, see 
Samantha Besson & José Luis Martí, Law and Republicanism, in LEGAL 
REPUBLICANISM: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 14-15 (Samantha 
Besson & José Luis Martí eds., 2009); Hamilton, supra note 178, at 1070. 
 183 Isaiah Berlin describes “[p]olitical liberty in this sense [as] simply the area 
within which a man can act unobstructed by others.” ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of 
Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 122 (1969). 
 184 Hamilton, supra note 178, at 1073. 
 185 Id. at 1074. 
 186 This is the correlativity thesis advanced by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, the 
influential cataloguer of legal rights. See generally WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, in FUNDAMENTAL 
LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 65 
(Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919). 
 187 Just as one party’s liberty correlates to another party’s absence of liberty in 
Hohfeld’s analysis of legal relations, a claim correlates to a duty. Id.; see also PAVLOS 
ELEFTHERIADIS, LEGAL RIGHTS 107-14 (2008) (discussing Hohfeld’s model of legal 
relations). The term “other-determining” in this article simply refers to the ability to 
determine or control the life course of another person.  
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These liberal political values and the institutional 
structures that actualize them have important implications for 
electoral inclusion/exclusion. One of these values is the 
democratic principle of presumptive inclusion, which aims at a 
minimum to secure individuals’ consent to being governed and 
to ensure that the laws directly or indirectly reflect the 
collective preference, defined as the aggregated preferences of 
the individual members of the political community. 
By registering a vote, an individual expresses his or her 
will or preference. A vote can be thought of as representing (1) 
the allotment or share of the individual’s influence over 
governance,188 (2) the individual’s transfer or surrender to the 
government of some corresponding share of the individual’s 
liberty (i.e., a transfer of power or authority) for the purpose of 
effectuating and enforcing the combined wills of the people, and 
(3) tacit acceptance that, once transferred to it, the government’s 
exercise of its accumulated authority is legitimate and binding, 
whether or not consistent with the individual’s preference.189 
Every person governs and is governed in equal measure 
under this liberal democratic conception of the franchise.190 No 
one person wields greater influence than another in the 
development of rules, and the resulting rules bind all equally. 
The categorical exclusion from the franchise of some 
members of the political community through voter qualification 
rules disrupts this symmetry. Excluded individuals are 
governed, yet they are denied a corresponding/offsetting share in 
influence over governance. In this sense, voter qualification 
rules that exclude some community members are democratic 
deficits. There is nonetheless general agreement that certain 
exclusionary rules can be legitimate,191 particularly when they 
ensure that voters meet the two basic criteria for inclusion—the 
relevant community interest, and competence. Rarely addressed, 
however, is why these criteria themselves are justified. 
  
 188 There are, of course, other means by which individuals might influence 
governance. See, e.g., BIRCH, supra note 9, at 159-63 (discussing various forms of direct and 
indirect methods by which individuals might influence decisions of government agencies). 
 189 The abstaining nonvoter, not prevented from voting by external or 
illegitimate forces, might be thought to have implicitly transferred her quantum of 
influence or individual liberty to the people as a whole, deferring and agreeing to the 
collective judgment. This type of nonvoting thus does not necessarily represent a 
democratic deficit. 
 190 This is the Aristotelian symmetrical conception of democratic legitimacy. 
See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE § 1275a8 (E. Barker trans., New York, 
Oxford Univ. Press ed. 1958). 
 191 BECKMAN, supra note 10, at 5. 
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One justification for the criteria is instrumental—i.e., 
without a connection to (and knowledge of) the community, and 
without adequate intellect and judgment, individuals cannot be 
relied upon to cast votes consistent with community interests. 
This justification can explain the ex ante exclusion of certain 
individuals from the franchise. The instrumental justification 
for the criteria for inclusion is insufficient, though, and the 
following two examples illustrate why. 
First, assume that an individual lives and works outside 
the political community and otherwise has no personal 
connection to it. Nonetheless present within it on Election Day, 
she casts a well-informed and public-minded vote. Why 
shouldn’t her vote be counted? The instrumentalist rationale 
justifies the outsider-voter’s ex ante exclusion by assuming that 
she is more likely than an insider-voter to cast a bad vote. It 
does not explain or justify, however, the ex post exclusion of the 
outsider-voter’s good vote. 
Second, assume that a member of the political 
community lacks electoral competence.192 The instrumental 
justification for excluding incompetent voters is weaker than the 
instrumental justification for excluding the outsider-voter. One 
might reason that the outsider-voter is more likely to cast a 
vote that considers short-term but not long-term consequences, 
or otherwise vote in a manner predictably at odds with the 
interests of the political community. The votes of incompetent 
individuals, however, will presumably be distributed randomly. 
Their random votes should thus cancel each other out and 
accordingly have no effect on electoral outcomes. 
I argue that a noninstrumental justification can explain 
and legitimize the exclusion of both the “good” outsider-voter 
and the incompetent voter. Recalling the liberal democratic 
conception of a vote’s meaning, these voters’ ballots denote (1) a 
share of influence over governance, but not (2) the transfer or 
surrender of a corresponding share of individual liberty to the 
government or (3) acceptance of the government’s resulting 
legitimate authority over them. The outsider-voter does not 
surrender a share of her liberty to the government or 
necessarily accept the government’s legitimate authority over 
her because she remains beyond its reach, outside the political 
community. The incompetent voter has influenced governance, 
albeit without the capacity to do so purposefully. She does not 
  
 192 In Part III, infra, I argue for a conception of electoral competence, but here 
let us simply assume the absence of the relevant competence, however it is conceived. 
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surrender liberty nor accept the legitimacy of government’s 
authority over her, however, because she presumably lacks the 
capacity to (even implicitly) do either. 
The outsiders’ and incompetent voters’ net influence 
over others would thus exceed that of others over them, and the 
degree by which the members of the political community are 
governed exceeds that by which they govern. By withholding 
the franchise from the community outsider and the 
incompetent individual, then, the state prevents the unequal 
distribution of liberty that would otherwise result and thus 
performs its liberty-preserving obligation.193 
Whether citizenship, residency, law abidingness, etc. are 
sufficiently reliable indicia of community interest/connection so 
as to justify various voter qualification rules is debatable. Those 
debates, however, are beyond the scope of this article. But 
whether age eighteen is a sufficiently reliable indicator of 
electoral competence so as to justify rules excluding younger 
members of the political community from the franchise (recalling 
that the burden of justifying exclusion rests with the state) is 
the heart of this article’s inquiry. 
III. ELECTORAL COMPETENCE 
Part II argued that the state bears the burden of 
justifying electoral exclusion, but that it may legitimately 
adopt standards that would exclude those who lack the 
requisite community connections/interest or the requisite 
electoral competence. This part argues for a conception of the 
competence to which the state may hold voting members of the 
political community. 
Democracy theorists today tend to shy away from the 
concept of competence, perhaps partly because political elites have 
historically, and notoriously, invoked the supposed incompetence 
of various groups—including women, African Americans, and the 
poor—to justify their categorical disfranchisement.194 
  
 193 See ELEFTHERIADIS, supra note 187, at 108-09.  
 194 Marion Smiley, Democratic Citizenship, in CITIZEN COMPETENCE, supra 
note 177, at 371, 380 (“[T]he very undemocratic history of the concept of competence in 
Western politics . . . has led most democratic theorists to steer away from the language 
of competence in discussions of citizenship.”). Smiley argues that the concept has 
reflected “inadvertent and unselfconscious biases . . . [as well as intentional] political 
machination.” Id. at 381; see also ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S 
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 278-80 (1988) (demonstrating the use of the 
concept of competence to justify the ongoing disfranchisement of African Americans 
and immigrants). 
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Some conception of competence, though, must underlie 
voting-age requirements. The connection/interest-related 
criterion cannot explain age-based exclusion. One might argue 
that the young are not members of the political community at 
all, and are thus not among those presumptively entitled to 
electoral inclusion. The argument fails, because while they may 
receive different treatment than do their elders when they 
violate government’s mandates, the young are nonetheless 
equally subject to them. One might alternatively argue that the 
young lack the requisite interest in, and connection to, the 
governance of the political community and are thus 
legitimately excluded. That argument, too, fails. As community 
residents (and the generally more vulnerable among them), the 
young have the same, if not greater, interests as their elders in 
issues of public concern—including public health, safety, and 
education.195 And as young people, they are more likely to bear 
the long-term consequences of public policy. The young are, 
therefore, members of the political community, with significant 
interest in that community and ongoing connections to it. 
It is thus young people’s lack of the relevant competence 
that must justify their electoral exclusion. There can be little 
dispute that newborns lack that competence, or that the typical 
person acquires it at some point over the course of his or her 
development. Age and cognitive development are predictably 
correlated.196 There is, then, a temporal element to the 
attainment of electoral competence, for which age is arguably 
the most reasonable proxy. The impracticality of widespread 
individual competence assessments, moreover, makes an age-
based qualification reasonable.  
A voting-age qualification thus helps ensure that voters 
will satisfy the criterion of electoral competence. What electoral 
competence entails, however, remains ill-defined, even among 
voting experts. One expert, for example, justified young 
people’s ongoing exclusion by stating that youth “under 18 do 
not have any competence to vote, [and they possess essentially] 
no knowledge. If they’re lucky, they have taken one civic 
course.”197 He added later, “[they are not] mature enough to 
  
 195 Indeed, the Supreme Court asserted in Brown v. Board of Education that 
“education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.” 347 
U.S. 483, 493 (1954); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (“Providing 
public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a state.”). 
 196 See infra note 260 and accompanying text. 
 197 Marilyn Rauber, Vote Early—And Young: It’s the Goal of Plans to Lower 
the Voting Age to 16, or Even 14, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, June 13, 2004, at A9, 
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make voting judgments because they don’t have any historical 
perspective and they don’t have any comparable civic 
responsibility.”198 These statements imply possible elements of 
a standard of competence: certain factual (perhaps civics-
related) knowledge, maturity of judgment, historical 
perspective, life experience, civic responsibility, etc. But are 
these the correct, or even among the correct, elements of the 
criterion of voting competence? And how can we assess whether 
young people have actually achieved these (or some other) 
elements of competence? This part answers these questions. 
Part III.A develops a new, cognitive-process-driven 
conception of electoral competence, informed by political 
science, behavioral decision research (including research on 
voter decision making), and developmental psychology. Part 
III.B describes the course of development of the relevant 
cognitive-processing capacities, reviewing research in 
developmental psychology and social and cognitive neuroscience. 
This research explains that, as well as why, adolescent decision-
making competence is context-specific. By midadolescence 
(around age sixteen), young people have attained adultlike 
cognitive-processing capacities. The domains in which they 
reliably and competently exercise these capacities are limited, 
but these situations include those allowing for unpressured, 
considered decision making. I conclude by arguing that privately 
casting a ballot in an election that has unfolded over time is 
such a domain. 
A. Conceptualizing Electoral Competence 
In this section, I first consider the voting rights of adults 
with cognitive impairments and explain why it is reasonable to 
apply a different—more lenient—standard of electoral 
competence to adults with cognitive disabilities than to youth. I 
then examine whether political/civic knowledge ought to figure 
into a concept of electoral competence and conclude that it 
ought not. I conclude by deriving a cognitive-process-driven 
conception of electoral competence. 
  
available at 2004 WLNR 1566663 (quoting Curtis Gans, Director of the Center for the 
Study of the American Electorate at American University). 
 198 Pam Belluck, The Voting Age: Sixteen Candles, but Few Blazing a Trail to 
the Ballot Box, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, (Week in Review), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/weekinreview/26belluck.html.  
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1. Adults with Cognitive Impairments and the 
Competence Assessment Tool for Voting 
Many democratic systems disfranchise the cognitively 
impaired.199 Nearly forty U.S. states, for example, have 
constitutional or statutory provisions prohibiting people with 
cognitive impairments from voting.200 Beginning in the 1990s, 
however, states began imposing procedural protections to 
guard against the unwarranted deprivation of various rights of 
cognitively impaired persons under guardianship, including the 
right to vote. Over thirty states now provide for individualized 
judicial determinations of whether persons under guardianship 
nonetheless retain the competence to vote.201 
In a 2001 case in which a group of cognitively impaired 
adults challenged their categorical disfranchisement under 
Maine law, a federal district court articulated a standard for 
voting competence that has since been widely cited and 
incorporated into a Competence Assessment Tool.202 The 
standard articulated in Doe v. Rowe requires simply that 
potential voters have “the mental capacity to make their own 
decision by being able to understand the nature and effect of 
the voting act itself.”203 
Using the Doe standard, psychiatrists developed the 
Competence Assessment Tool for Voting (CAT-V), a 
questionnaire administered to individuals to assess their 
voting capacity.204 The questionnaire is brief (seven questions) 
and asks respondents to imagine that it is election day for the 
office of state governor. It then asks questions aimed to 
  
 199 The federal Voter Registration Act limits states’ discretion to disfranchise 
voters but exempts state decisions to do so “by reason of criminal conviction or mental 
incapacity.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(a)(3)(B) (2006). For discussions of the voting rights of 
cognitively impaired adults generally, see Pamela S. Karlan, Framing the Voting 
Rights Claims of Cognitively Impaired Individuals, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 917 (2007); 
Note, Mental Disability and the Right to Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979). For a list of 
state provisions addressing the voting rights of adults with cognitive impairments, see 
Sally Balch Hurme & Paul S. Appelbaum, Defining and Assessing Capacity to Vote: The 
Effect of Mental Impairment on the Rights of Voters, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 931, app. A 
& B (2007). For an overview of the electoral laws of other nations governing the voting 
rights of the elderly and cognitively impaired, see Jason H. Karlawish & Richard J. 
Bonnie, Voting by Elderly Persons with Cognitive Impairment: Lessons from Other 
Democratic Nations, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 879 (2007). 
 200 Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 199, at app. A. 
 201 Id. at 933. 
 202 Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Me. 2001). 
 203 Id. at 51 (citing Def. Mot. for Summ. J. at 8, No. 1:00 CV 00206 (Mar. 8, 2001)). 
 204 The study was reported in Raymond Raad, Jason Karlawish, & Paul S. 
Appelbaum, The Capacity of Vote of Persons with Serious Mental Illness, 60 
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 624 (2009). 
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ascertain respondents’ understanding of the nature of voting 
(“What will the people of [person’s state] do today to pick the 
next Governor?”205) and the effect of voting (“When the election 
for governor is over, how will it be decided who the winner 
is?”206). The test then provides information about two 
hypothetical candidates and asks the respondent to compare 
them, choose one, and then discuss the potential consequences 
to the respondent of that candidate’s election.207 
If the Doe standard or something like it defines electoral 
competence, then a large category of young people—including 
many preadolescents—could very well qualify as competent to 
vote. Still, young individuals (who may or may not have 
attained electoral competence) and cognitively impaired 
individuals (who have attained the age of presumptive electoral 
competence) differ in significant respects relevant to voting. 
Age-qualified individuals with mental impairments are 
members of the in-group that has presumptively attained the 
development-related cognitive capacities required for electoral 
competence. The function of a standard by which to determine 
their competence is to assess whether the nature of individuals’ 
cognitive impairments are such that the presumption of 
competence ought not apply to them—i.e., their impairments 
have prevented them from developing the relevant cognitive 
capacities, or have caused them to lose the relevant capacities. 
The state, however, must overcome two presumptions before 
being justified in disfranchising a cognitively impaired adult. 
First, it bears the burden of justifying electoral exclusion. Second, 
all age-qualified individuals are members of the group that has 
satisfied the presumption of electoral competence. Adults with 
cognitive impairments should receive the benefit of that 
presumption. In other words, evidence of electoral incompetence 
must be persuasive in order to justify the competence-related 
disfranchisement of an age-qualified individual. 
The purpose of a standard by which to measure the 
electoral competence of young people, on the other hand, is to 
assess as an initial matter their acquisition as a group of the 
array of cognitive capacities required for competent voting. Thus 
while the Doe standard might suffice to indicate adequate 
electoral competence despite cognitive impairment, it is not 
  
 205 Competence Assessment Tool for Voting (CAT-V), PSYCHIATRYONLINE.ORG, 
http://ap.psychiatryonline.org/data/Journals/PSS/3878/pss_60_05_624_02.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2012). 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. 
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necessarily adequate to assess the initial development-related 
attainment of the array of cognitive capacities required for 
electoral competence. 
The next subsections develop a normative standard of 
electoral competence, beginning by considering whether 
competence properly includes political or civics knowledge. 
2. Electoral Competence and Political/Civics 
Knowledge? 
Rousseau believed that a well-informed citizenry was 
necessary to determine and implement the public good.208 
Modern democracy theorists, too, have argued that informed and 
watchful citizens help ensure a responsive, accountable 
government.209 There are several reasons, however, for excluding 
factual knowledge from our conception of electoral competence.210 
First, voluminous data methodically gathered since the 
1930s211 have consistently shown the typical citizen to be far 
  
 208 See Nisbet, supra note 156, at 102-03. 
 209 Theorists have argued that citizens can perform this function even if they 
do little more than vote out of office those representatives who underperform. See 
SCHUMPETER, supra note 146, at 272 (“[E]lectorates normally do not control their 
political leaders in any way except by refusing to reelect them . . . .”). Probably the 
best-known account of a theory of what is now termed “retrospective voting” is MORRIS 
FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN NATIONAL PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (1981). 
Political theorists note that several of Fiorina’s empirical assumptions were mistaken. 
See, e.g., MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT 
POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS XI (1996); RICHARD R. LAU & DAVID P. REDLAWSK, HOW 
VOTERS DECIDE: INFORMATION PROCESSING DURING ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 72 (2006). 
Delli Carpini and Keeter use public-opinion surveys to highlight various characteristics 
of better-informed citizens, such as their improved abilities to “connect their 
enlightened self-interest to specific opinions about the political world,” concluding that 
“informed citizens are better citizens in a number of ways consistent with normative 
and pragmatic notions of what constitutes good citizenship.” DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, 
supra, at 19. 
 210 To argue that political knowledge ought not figure into our conception of 
electoral competence is not to say that political knowledge is unimportant. Delli 
Carpini and Keeter have identified broad categories of information likely to be relevant 
to voting, which citizens would thus ideally be familiar with. These are 
(1) [T]he rules of the game (the institutions and processes of elections and 
governance); (2) the substance of politics (the major domestic and 
international issues of the day, current social and economic conditions, key 
policy initiatives, and so forth); and (3) people and parties (the promises, 
performances, and attributes of candidates, public officials, and the political 
parties). 
DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 209, at 14.  
 211 Id. at 62-67. Delli Carpini and Keeter gathered national survey data to 
assess Americans’ political knowledge over time. They note that the most 
comprehensive collection of public-opinion surveys dates to the 1930s; this collection is 
held at the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University of Connecticut. 
Id. at 66; see also Public Opinion Archives, ROPER CTR., UNIV. OF CONN., 
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removed from the ideal citizen of classic democratic theory.212 
Instead, “a large segment of the public has been and remains 
woefully ignorant about virtually every aspect of American 
politics.”213 Studies find that public ignorance extends to 
knowledge of basic civics and government.214 
Widespread voter ignorance alone arguably renders 
infeasible the adoption of specific factual knowledge as a 
component of voting competence. Incorporating even basic 
levels of civics or political knowledge into a conception of 
electoral competence theoretically justifies voter qualification 
rules that would operate to disfranchise a significant 
proportion of the current (aged eighteen and over) electorate. 
Rates of disfranchisement would be unequally distributed 
across the population based on differences in knowledge among 
  
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2012). The American National 
Election Studies is a national research resource that has surveyed voting, public 
opinion, and political participation during national elections since 1948. The University 
of Michigan Institute for Social Research (joined in 2006 by Stanford University) 
conducts the surveys, which have been funded by the National Science Foundation 
since the 1970s. Press Release, Univ. of Mich. News Serv., NSF Awards $10 Million for 
American National Election Studies (Feb. 26, 2010), available at http://ns.umich.edu/ 
htdocs/releases/story.php?id=7542. 
 212 See Richard R. Lau & David P. Redlawsk, Voting Correctly, 91 POL. SCI. 
REV. 585, 585 (1997) (“[O]nly a tiny minority of the citizens in any democracy actually 
live up to these ideals. Interest in politics is generally weak, discussion is rare, political 
knowledge on the average is pitifully low, and few people actively participate in politics 
beyond voting.”); see also RICK SHENKMAN, JUST HOW STUPID ARE WE?: FACING THE 
TRUTH ABOUT THE AMERICAN VOTER 22 (2008). 
  A number of political scientists have suggested, however, that flaws in the 
way pollsters conduct public-opinion surveys can lead to the underreporting of political 
knowledge. See, e.g., Melissa K. Miller & Shannon K. Orr, Experimenting with a “Third 
Way” in Political Knowledge Estimation, 72 PUB. OP. Q. 768 (2008); Jeffrey J. Mondak, 
Developing Valid Knowledge Scales, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 224 (2001); Jeffrey J. Mondak, 
Reconsidering the Measurement of Political Knowledge, 8 POL. ANALYSIS 57 (2000); 
Markus Prior & Arthur Lupia, Money, Time, and Political Knowledge: Distinguishing 
Quick Recall and Political Learning Skills, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 169 (2008). Some have 
found that the number of correct responses increased somewhat when respondents 
were discouraged or prevented from responding “don’t know,” Miller & Orr, supra at 
775-76, 779; given an incentive to respond correctly (such as one dollar for each correct 
answer), Prior & Lupia, supra at 169; or given extra time in which to respond (such as 
twenty-four hours as opposed to one minute), id. at 169, 171. 
 213 Stephen C. Craig & Michael D. Martinez, Voter Competence, in THE 
ELECTORAL CHALLENGE: THEORY MEETS PRACTICE 62, 65 (Stephen C. Craig & David B. 
Hill eds., 2010). 
 214 See SUSAN JACOBY, THE AGE OF AMERICAN UNREASON 299-300 (2008) 
(reporting the results of surveys conducted by the National Constitution Center); Mark 
M. Blumenthal, The Political Professionals Respond, in THE ELECTORAL CHALLENGE, 
supra note 213, at 83 (“[One] can almost never underestimate the level of information 
about politics and government possessed by the voters who typically decide the 
outcome of elections.”). 
  At least one study suggests that teens are even less knowledgeable than their 
elders: whereas about 50 percent of adults could name the three branches of government, 
for example, only 41 percent of teenagers could do so. JACOBY, supra, at 299-300. 
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various groups that have held steady over time—rates would 
likely be higher among women than men, African Americans 
than whites, high school graduates than college graduates, low-
income earners than high-income earners, and people under 
thirty than those sixty-five and older.215 
Public educational policy should certainly endeavor to 
ensure that citizens will possess basic categories of civics and 
political knowledge. Formal requirements aimed at ensuring 
well-informed voting, however, would likely result in a better-
informed electorate, but also a less representative and 
democratic one. 
Excluding a factual-knowledge component from a 
conception of electoral competence is also reasonable in light of 
variability in the instrumental utility of political knowledge 
itself.216 
First, the utility of political knowledge is situational; its 
value will depend on the decision-making context.217 A voter’s 
intimate knowledge of campaign-finance legislation, for 
example, does not help him or her decide whether to vote in 
favor of a proposed school-redistricting plan. It is thus difficult 
to identify with any certainty the knowledge required for 
competent voting in a given election, and knowledge 
requirements are likely to change from one election to the next. 
Second, the utility of political knowledge is collective, in 
that the greater the aggregate amount of such knowledge, the 
greater the likelihood that the citizenry’s decisions will 
accurately reflect the will of the people.218 Because random or 
  
 215 Public Knowledge of Current Affairs Little Changed by News and 
Information Revolutions: What Americans Know: 1989-2007: Summary of Findings, 
PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS (Apr. 15, 2007), http://people-
press.org/report/319/public-knowledge-of-current-affairs-little-changed-by-news-and-
information-revolutions. 
 216 DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 209, at 12-16 (1996). Delli Carpini 
and Keeter define “political knowledge” as the range of factual information about 
politics retained in memory. Id. at 10. “Factual information” refers to (correct) 
knowledge, distinct from opinions, values, and other cognitive processes like reasoning. 
Id. at 10-11. Retained factual information provides a context for understanding, 
assimilating, and assessing newly acquired information. Id. at 337 n.3. 
  Delli Carpini and Keeter also argue that the instrumental value of 
knowledge is relative, in that, all other things being equal, more information is better 
than less information. Id. at 14-15. Behavioral decision research, discussed infra Part 
III.A.3, provides some evidence to the contrary. Id. Belief in the relative value of 
knowledge, however, also suggests that citizens ought to become relatively “better” 
voters over time (in that they more accurately identify and vote consistently with their 
own interests); lifelong accumulation and assimilation of information enables voters to 
refine their opinions and interests and vote accordingly. Id.  
 217 Id. at 14. 
 218 Id. at 15. 
1496 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:4 
uninformed views cancel each other out, the “miracle of 
aggregation” generally results in collective decisions that reflect 
those beliefs that are well informed and coherent.219 Thus, while 
a broadly informed public is critical to the functioning of a 
democratic system, broadly informed citizens are less critical. 
Finally, individuals may have a variety of goals when 
making their vote decisions. Not all voters necessarily seek to 
cast a vote for the candidate who “would, if elected, produce a 
better outcome set from [the voter’s] point of view.”220 Some 
voters may have less instrumental goals, regarding their vote as 
a “speech-act” with primarily expressive or symbolic (rather than 
instrumental) value.221 This use of one’s ballot is not irrational, 
given the negligible real-world influence of the individual’s vote 
on an election’s outcome. Since individual voters may want to 
cast their ballots so as to express any number of messages, 
values, or beliefs, this possible use of the vote, too, weighs against 
substantive standards of voter knowledge. 
When considering both limited voter knowledge and 
arguments against adopting knowledge requirements as a 
condition of electoral competence, questions arise as to how 
(relatively uninformed) voters do go about making their vote 
decisions and how electoral competence ought to be defined and 
assessed. I address these questions in the next subsections by 
providing a descriptive account of voter decision making drawn 
from behavioral decision and cognitive performance research 
then arguing for a standard of electoral competence that is 
cognitive-process driven rather than knowledge based. 
3. Normative Decision Theory and Actual Voter 
Decision Making: Insights from Behavioral Decision 
and Cognitive Performance Research 
Normative decision theory prescribes a decision-making 
model whose rules lead the individual decision maker “to 
  
 219 Some studies have shown that errors do not always cancel each other out; 
instead, voters might share misperceptions that reflect lopsided biases. In these cases, 
low levels of political knowledge might indeed skew election results. Craig & Martinez, 
supra note 213, at 77-78, 81-82. 
 220 ALVIN GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD 323 (1999). Goldman is a 
philosopher who has studied voting and voter knowledge as part of a larger project 
aimed at identifying the social practices and institutions “that would best advance the 
cause of knowledge.” Id. at 79. 
 221 See, e.g., GEOFFREY BRENNAN & ALAN HAMLIN, DEMOCRATIC DEVICES AND 
DESIRES 130-31, 136-47 (2000) (developing an expressive view of voting behavior in 
which individuals consider voting to be primarily a “speech-act,” as opposed to serving 
other instrumental interests). 
2012] DEMOCRATIC INCLUSION 1497 
choos[e] the option with the highest expected utility,” based on 
the individual’s beliefs and values.222 It describes decision 
making as a logical process that involves (1) identifying the 
relevant options, (2) predicting the possible outcomes associated 
with each option and the probability of each outcome’s 
occurrence, (3) determining the relative value/utility of each 
outcome, and (4) combining the probabilities of occurrence and 
the utility of each option to identify (and choose) the option that 
maximizes expected value.223 
Just as they rarely possess optimal levels of political 
knowledge, individuals also rarely make decisions using the 
value-maximizing, decision-making model.224 Normative 
analysis is thus just the starting point of behavioral decision 
research. That research instead recognizes that people are not 
always rational, that they can make choices that are rational 
without using rational processes, and that they may have goals 
other than making the most rational choice in a given decision-
making context.225 
Empirical political scientists Richard Lau and David 
Redlawsk have extensively researched voters’ decision making and 
conclude that “classic democratic theory sets unrealistic standards 
for ideal citizens at least in part because it holds unrealistic 
expectations about the very nature of human cognition.”226 
Individuals’ limited cognitive-processing abilities allow them to 
absorb and process only a small fraction of the barrage of 
information to which they are typically exposed, including political 
information.227 Limited information combined with limited time 
and motivation can impede rational decision making.228 
  
 222 Baruch Fischhoff, Assessing Adolescent Decision-Making Competence, 28 
DEV. REV. 12, 13 (2008). See generally REID K. HASTIE & ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL 
CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD (2001); SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 79-83 (1993). 
 223 Eric Amsel et al., Anticipating and Avoiding Regret as a Model of 
Adolescent Decision Making, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION 
MAKING IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 119, 120-21 (Janis E. Jacobs & Paul A. 
Klaczynski eds., 2005). See generally HASTIE & DAWES, supra note 222; Lita Furby & 
Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk Taking in Adolescence: A Decision-Making Perspective, 12 
DEV. REV. 1 (1992). 
 224 LAU & REDLAWSK, supra note 209, at 22. 
 225 Fischhoff, supra note 222, at 13. 
 226 LAU & REDLAWSK, supra note 209, at 29. 
 227 Id. at 73-74. Thus: 
Citizens do not have all the information about politics that is required of 
them by classic democratic theory; neither do they process that information 
in as logical a way as those theorists hoped, in large part because of strict 
cognitive limitations. It is not so much that people do a particularly bad job of 
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From a behavioral economics perspective, voter ignorance 
makes good sense:229 the cost to voters of acquiring information 
about electoral politics (policy issues, candidates’ platforms, etc.) 
outweighs the expected benefit (the increased likelihood of casting 
a vote that accurately reflects voters’ values/preferences).230 
In lieu of incurring the cost of educating themselves, 
voters generally rely on more readily available “information 
shortcuts” such as party affiliation and a candidate’s or party’s 
past performance.231 These shortcuts (more broadly referred to 
by theorists today as heuristics232) substitute for more complete 
information, allowing voters to make decisions reasonably 
consistent with their preferences while expending relatively 
little effort.233 Heuristics that voters commonly use in political 
  
processing political information, of course, but rather that we do an equally 
bad job of processing any other type of complex information. 
Id. 
 228 In contrast to the rational actors identified in economic decision-making 
models, people tend to be what political scientist Herbert Simon terms “boundedly 
rational information processors.” Herbert Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the 
Environment, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 129, 136 (1956). The actual decision-making process 
generally aims not to “maximize” or identify the optimal option, but instead more 
modestly to “satisfice” or identify an adequate or satisfactory option. See generally 
Herbert Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955). 
Individuals’ desire to make a good decision thus competes with their desire to expend 
minimal cognitive effort in making that decision. LAU & REDLAWSK, supra note 209, at 29. 
 229 In his now classic treatise, economist Anthony Downs famously described voters 
as rationally ignorant. ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 246 (1957). 
 230 Id. at 246-52. 
 231 Id. at 238-44. 
 232 Cognitive psychologists have identified three categories of judgment 
heuristics that decision makers use in order to simplify complex decisions and avoid 
burdensome information gathering and analysis. They are (1) availability—judging 
probability, frequency, and causality by how easily concrete examples come to mind 
(e.g., when a voter encounters an unfamiliar candidate who is a Democrat, the voter’s 
first thought may be that Democrats favor higher taxes, and she may then apply that 
attribute to the new candidate), Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124-27 (1974); (2) representativeness—assigning 
new information to broader preexisting categories (such as stereotypes or other 
schema) with which it best fits (e.g., applying stereotypes based on gender, race, or age 
to fill in an impression of a candidate, or partisan schemata to do the same), id. at 
1127-28; and (3) anchoring and adjustment—using preexisting knowledge or judgment 
as a starting point or presumption, then adjusting by reviewing new information 
(rather than independently and fully evaluating new information), id. at 1128-30. 
People generally categorize new information into a preexisting schema or group with 
certain default characteristics. Categorization is cognitively efficient because it allows 
people to ignore details of the new information and assign to it the default values 
already associated with the schema. LAU & REDLAWSK, supra note 209, at 26.  
 233 Kahneman, supra note 232, at 1124; see also LAU & REDLAWSK, supra note 
209, at 13. Samuel Popkin elaborates on Downs’s model in THE REASONING VOTER: 
COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS (2d ed. 1994). He 
argues that, despite decades of studies that show low levels of civics and political 
knowledge, people acquire a great deal of information in their daily lives, such as 
information about the economy or their communities, which they then apply to political 
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decision making include party affiliation, group endorsements, 
person stereotypes such as gender, race, or age, and poll results 
indicating candidate viability.234 
Researchers have studied the effectiveness of heuristic 
use as a decision-making strategy. In what has become a 
widely used method for evaluating an individual’s vote 
decision, Lau and Redlawsk identify “a correct vote decision as 
one that is the same as the choice that would have been made 
under conditions of full information,” given the subjective 
beliefs and values of the individual voter.235 Voter ignorance, 
they argue, poses a less serious concern for democracy if people 
vote correctly most of the time, despite low levels of 
information and knowledge.236 They found “that limited 
information decision strategies not only may perform as well 
as, but in many instances may perform better than, traditional 
rational . . . decision strategies.”237 
Cognitive psychologists have conducted research in 
other decision-making contexts that confirms that in some 
cases, excess information—i.e., a volume of information that is 
beyond an individual’s cognitive-processing capacity—hurts 
decision making, presumably by confusing individuals or 
otherwise making it more difficult for them to identify and 
retain salient information.238 In certain decision-making 
contexts, a greater amount of preexisting knowledge can hinder 
rational analysis of a new set of facts.239 In making judgments, 
people generally bring to bear their prior knowledge; in many 
contexts, this improves decision making. But in decision-
making tasks calling for “decontextualized” reasoning—which 
  
decision making. Id. at 22-30. Popkin incorporates insights from cognitive psychology 
to explain the ways in which voters process and weigh the information they have 
gained. In general, voters incorporate information selectively, assembling “narratives” 
(often based on their assessment of personal information or behavior rather than 
professional record) that tend to fit within a preexisting frame or point of view, and 
weighing more heavily newly available information. Id. 
  Political scientists recognize the universality of voters’ heuristic-based 
judgment- and decision-making strategies—the “cognitive shortcuts, rules of thumb for 
making certain judgments or inferences with considerably less [effort] than the 
complete search for alternatives and their consequences that is dictated by rational 
choice.” LAU & REDLAWSK, supra note 209, at 25. Lau and Redlawsk observe that 
“[p]olitical heuristic use is nigh onto universal.” Id. at 236. 
 234 Particularly in primaries, poll results can inform voters which candidates seem 
to be gaining consensus support and which seem to be hopelessly behind. Id. at 233-35. 
 235 Id. at 74-75 (emphasis added). 
 236 Id. at 74. 
 237 Id. at 226. 
 238 Id. at 212. 
 239 See generally Deanna Kuhn et al., Developing Reason, 10 THINKING & 
REASONING 197 (2004) (reporting studies). 
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requires evaluation only of evidence presented—real-world 
knowledge hampers analysis. Decontextualized reasoning 
improves the evaluation of causation—e.g., a jury’s evaluation 
of evidence in order to reach a verdict—and deductive 
reasoning generally.240  
Preexisting knowledge and beliefs can hinder cognitive 
performance in other ways. They can lead, for example, to “undue 
certainty in one’s judgments.”241 Persons with preexisting beliefs 
or theories tend to subject new information to inconsistent 
standards of evidence in order to protect their preferred 
theories.242 Cognitive psychologist Deanna Kuhn concludes that 
“the causal reasoning of average adults regarding everyday 
matters is in fact highly fallible. People frequently make 
unwarranted inferences with unwarranted certainty . . . .”243 
“Undue certainty” in one’s beliefs in turn “underlies the rigidity 
in thinking that is a major contributor to human strife.”244 
At least in some contexts, then, less knowledge leads to 
more objective analysis and thus improves cognitive 
performance.245 Research confirms common wisdom that, with 
age and experience, people can become less open minded, less 
objective when analyzing new evidence, and generally more “set 
in their ways.” Knowledge can lead to cognitive biases that 
  
 240 To give an example from one recently reported study, adults examined the 
following syllogism involving deductive reasoning: 
Syllogism 1 
Premise 1: All living things need water. 
Premise 2: Roses need water. 
Conclusion: Roses are living things.  
Deanna Kuhn, Jumping to Conclusions, 18 SCI. AM. MIND 44, 49 (2007). Although the 
conclusion does not follow logically from the premises, 70 percent of adults studied 
accepted the syllogism as valid. Compare it with the second syllogism presented to 
them, identical in form to the first: 
Syllogism 2 
Premise 1: All animals of the hudon class are ferocious. 
Premise 2: Wampets are ferocious. 
Conclusion: Wampets are animals of the hudon class. 
Id. at 50. Only 20 percent of adults accepted this conclusion as valid, with 80 percent 
(correctly) rejecting it. What explains the difference in performance? Researchers posit 
that, because adults know the conclusion of Syllogism 1 to be true in the real world, 
they easily accept it, although it does not follow logically from the premises. They were 
able to analyze Syllogism 2 more accurately, “however, because no obfuscating real-
world knowledge” clouded their analysis. Id. at 49-50. 
 241 Id. at 50. This sort of misplaced certainty “reflects a failure” of 
metacognition, or “knowing what [one] know[s].” Id.  
 242 Id.  
 243 Id. at 51. 
 244 Id. at 50. 
 245 Id. at 49-50. 
2012] DEMOCRATIC INCLUSION 1501 
impede analysis. Youth and inexperience may, perhaps 
counterintuitively, contribute to superior cognitive performance. 
Objective reasoning can improve with practice, however, 
even into adulthood. Other studies conducted by Kuhn and her 
colleagues demonstrated that both children and adults became 
more careful and critical causal reasoners when given frequent 
opportunities to practice evaluating evidence.246 “Early 
adolescents [and young adults who initially] show[ed] faulty 
multivariable causal reasoning” also showed significant 
improvement after engaging with similar problems over the 
course of several months.247 
Therefore, for most voters, the cost of acquiring and 
processing full political information prior to casting a vote is 
prohibitive, or at least generally outweighs the benefits of 
doing so. The typical voter nonetheless generally reaches 
rational and “correct” decisions by acquiring and processing 
smaller, readily available bits of meaningful information that 
function as serviceable substitutes for full information. Finally, 
some research suggests that less preexisting knowledge or 
experience can, in some instances, improve objective analysis of 
new information. 
In the next subsection I propose a normative standard of 
electoral competence that accounts for this more nuanced 
understanding of voter knowledge and voter decision making. 
4. In Support of a Cognitive-Process-Driven Conception 
of Electoral Competence 
I argue for a standard of competence that is process 
driven rather than knowledge based. As discussed above, 
incorporating factual knowledge into a normative standard of 
electoral competence risks disfranchising much of the current 
electorate and is unnecessary to ensure correct vote decisions. 
Even without requiring specific knowledge, however, it is 
possible to identify the cognitive processes, or mental 
operations, involved in—and required for—competent voting.  
Cognitive processes include (1) learning and retrieving 
information; (2) encoding, which involves forming a mental 
representation of information or a situation; and (3) thinking, 
which is the goal-directed application and “coordination of 
  
 246 Id. at 51. 
 247 Id.; see also DEANNA KUHN, EDUCATION FOR THINKING 91-101 (2005) 
(summarizing studies). 
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inferences”248 and includes various forms of reasoning.249 When 
thinkers deliberately constrain their inferences so as to conform 
to what they believe are appropriate inferential norms, they 
engage in reasoning.250 Forms of reasoning include deductive, 
inductive, and analogical reasoning, as well as decision making 
and problem solving.251 Reasoning supplies a person with 
reasons for his or her beliefs and actions, or justifiability. The 
ability to appropriately apply and coordinate various reasoning 
processes is a fundamental aspect of “[r]ationality, [which] in its 
oldest[ and] broadest . . . sense . . . [requires] good reasons for 
one’s beliefs and actions.”252 
Rationality does not necessarily require applying formal 
logic to a set of premises or adhering to a normative, value-
maximizing decision-making process. These formal cognitive 
processes will indeed provide “good reasons” for one’s 
conclusions, but, as developmental psychologist David 
Moshman asserts, “Even in the absence of formal proof, we 
often have good enough reason to choose one belief or course of 
action over another. There is much more to rationality than 
formal logic.”253 
Consider a typical voter: in order to cast a nonrandom 
vote, she must go through the process of acquiring some 
relevant knowledge/information. In an election in which 
numerous candidates are vying for a number of offices, for 
example, the typical voter is unlikely to have gathered full 
information about all the candidates for each office. The voter 
might learn from the election ballot itself only the names and 
party affiliations of candidates seeking a certain local office. 
Our typical voter has thus learned a limited amount of 
information. After acquiring that information (itself a cognitive 
process), the voter applies additional cognitive processes to it. 
The voter may recall that Republicans generally favor lower 
taxes. She makes the inference that the Republican candidate is 
more likely to favor lower taxes than the Democratic candidate, 
and infers further that electing a Republican to office makes it 
more likely that taxes will be reduced. She believes that a tax 
  
 248 DAVID MOSHMAN, ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT: 
RATIONALITY, MORALITY, AND IDENTITY 25-26 (2d ed. 2005).  
 249 James P. Byrnes, Cognitive Development During Adolescence, in 
BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENCE 227, 228 (Gerald R. Adams & Michael D. 
Berzonsky eds., 2003). 
 250 Id. 
 251 Id. at 227. 
 252 MOSHMAN, supra note 248, at 16. 
 253 Id. 
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reduction would help her and other middle-class workers like 
her. She also notes that the Democratic candidate is a woman, 
and surmises that this candidate might be even more liberal and 
pro-government spending than the typical Democrat. As a 
result, she votes for the Republican candidate. Although the 
voter has not made a particularly well-informed decision, she 
has arguably made a minimally competent one, and one likely to 
be correct (i.e., consistent with the decision she would have made 
had she possessed full information). 
Therefore, our typical voter acquired relevant 
information about the candidates, retrieved relevant encoded 
information from her long-term memory, and applied deductive 
reasoning to reach conclusions about the candidates that led 
her to make a choice that she could justify with a good-enough 
reason. I thus begin by suggesting that a minimally competent 
voting decision involves the appropriate application and 
coordination of various reasoning processes to make a choice 
that could be justified by a good-enough reason. 
This definition of competent voting might usefully be 
refined further. One possible refinement would require that 
instead of employing merely “appropriate” reasoning processes, 
competent voting employs “mature” reasoning processes. 
Requiring “mature” reasoning processes may go too far, though. 
While the level of thinking of many individuals continues to 
develop through and beyond adolescence, developmental 
psychologists have determined that there is no universal state 
of maturity attained by all, or even most, adults. Instead, the 
development of thinking in and beyond adolescence is highly 
variable, depending on individual interests, activities, and 
contexts.254 A “mature” cognitive-processing requirement for 
electoral competence, then, like a factual-knowledge 
requirement, would exceed the capacities of—and thus 
disfranchise—many current voters. 
A more pragmatic standard for electoral competence 
could modestly require “adultlike” cognitive-processing 
capacities—i.e., the minimum levels of thinking and processing 
attained by developmentally normal adults. 
  
 254 Id. at 24 (observing that while the concepts and forms of reasoning of many 
individuals continue to develop after childhood, “postchildhood developmental changes 
in thinking are not tied to age and do not culminate in a state of maturity”). Cf. 
Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: 
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 
58 AM. PSYCHOL. 1009, 1016-17 (2003). 
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The resulting standard of electoral competence thus 
provides that a minimally competent voting decision involves 
an adultlike application and coordination of various reasoning 
processes to make a choice that could be justified by a good-
enough reason. 
The next section surveys recent research on adolescent 
development and concludes that adolescents reliably attain the 
relevant cognitive-processing abilities by age fifteen or sixteen. 
B. Assessing Electoral Competence 
Researchers who study cognitive development cannot 
precisely identify every context in which developmentally 
normal citizens are likely to have decision-making competence, 
given both individual and situational, or context-specific, 
variability.255 But, scientists have made two critical findings. 
First, by midadolescence, individuals have the cognitive 
capacity to make competent decisions. Second, certain 
situations and factors can hinder the decision-making abilities 
that adolescents otherwise possess.256 
This section first canvasses research on adolescent 
cognitive development from various disciplines in the 
developmental sciences. I then conclude that the factors that 
characterize the vote decision-making context (time for 
deliberation, the absence of peers, etc.) render voting the type 
of domain in which midadolescents will capably exercise the 
relevant cognitive-processing capacities. 
1. Cognitive and Socio-Emotional Development: 
Insights from Behavioral Psychology and 
Developmental Neuroscience 
Adolescence, the developmental period between childhood 
and adulthood, is characterized by increases in both rational 
decision-making capacity and irrational risk-taking behavior.257 
Developmental neuroscientists have begun developing a 
neurologically based model that has the potential to explain the 
simultaneous increases in adolescents’ risk taking and poor 
decision making on the one hand, and improved cognitive ability 
  
 255 MOSHMAN, supra note 248, at 13. 
 256 See infra notes 271-74 and accompanying text. 
 257 B.J. Casey et al., The Adolescent Brain, 28 DEV. REV. 62, 63 (2008); Charles 
Geier & Beatriz Luna, The Maturation of Incentive Processing and Cognitive Control, 
93 PHARMACOLOGY, BIOCHEMISTRY & BEHAV. 212, 216 (2009).  
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on the other.258 A brief discussion of relevant aspects of 
adolescent development follows, first from the perspective of 
behavioral science and then from that of developmental 
neuroscience.259 
Cognitive capacity, including learning and reasoning 
from facts and information processing, improves more or less 
linearly throughout childhood, reaching adultlike levels by 
midadolescence.260 Researchers have consistently found “[t]he 
logical reasoning and basic information-processing abilities of 
16-year-olds” to be “comparable to [or essentially 
indistinguishable from] those of adults.”261 By midadolescence, 
thinking processes are adultlike. According to developmental 
psychologist David Moshman, “[n]o theorist or researcher has 
ever identified a form or level of thinking routine among adults 
that is rarely seen in adolescents.”262 
Despite their apparently advanced cognitive abilities, 
universal characteristics of adolescent behavior include 
increased propensities for impulsivity, risk taking, and 
sensation seeking.263 Early behavioral decision models attributed 
these behavioral characteristics to cognitive deficiencies that 
caused adolescents to misperceive risks and fail to appreciate   
 258 Casey et al., supra note 257, at 63 (discussing cognitive and neurobiological 
hypotheses that fail to adequately account for adolescent decision-making behavior). 
Developmental psychologist Laurence Steinberg recently emphasized the importance—
to all disciplines within developmental science—of research in developmental 
neuroscience, suggesting that this research has the “potential to structure a new, 
overarching model of normative . . . adolescent development.” Laurence Steinberg, A 
Behavioral Scientist Looks at the Science of Adolescent Brain Development, 72 BRAIN & 
COGNITION 160, 162 (2010) [hereinafter Steinberg, Adolescent Brain Development]. See 
generally Laurence Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk-
Taking, 28 DEV. REV. 78 (2008) [hereinafter Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking]. 
 259 For a summary of cognitive development from early childhood through 
early adulthood, see Hamilton, supra note 178, at 1099-1116. 
 260 Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults?: 
Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-
Flop,” 6 AM. PSYCHOL. 583, 590-92 (2009). 
 261 Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 258, at 80. 
 262 MOSHMAN, supra note 248, at 24. 
 263 Sara B. Johnson et al., Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise 
and Pitfalls of Neuroscience Research in Adolescent Health Policy, 45 J. ADOLESCENT 
HEALTH 216, 218 (2009). Compared with adults over twenty-five, adolescents and 
young adults are more likely to binge drink, commit crimes, engage in violence, have 
casual sex, and cause serious or fatal automobile accidents. Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-
Taking, supra note 258, at 79; see also Michael Windle & Rebecca C. Windle, Alcohol 
and Other Substance Use and Abuse, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK, supra note 249, at 
450-63 (surveying empirical studies on the onset and escalation of substance use 
among adolescents). 
  Developmental scientists reason that evolutionary processes would have 
selected for these characteristics, which presumably motivated adolescents (of all 
cultures and species) to leave their natal environments and seek out mates. Steinberg, 
Adolescent Brain Development, supra note 258, at 161. 
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the long-term consequences of their decisions.264 Intervention 
programs implemented to counteract these cognitive deficiencies 
by correcting adolescents’ misperceptions about common risks, 
however, were largely ineffectual in changing adolescent 
behavior.265 Studies, moreover, revealed no cognitive differences 
between adolescents and adults that could explain their 
different propensities for risk taking.266 
Behavioral scientists thus reached the counterintuitive 
conclusion that adolescents engage in higher rates of risky, 
seemingly irrational behavior than do adults despite being as 
“knowledgeable, logical, reality-based, and accurate in the 
ways in which they think about risky activity . . . as their 
elders.”267 Cognitive deficiencies do not account for adolescents’ 
propensity for risky and impulsive decision making. Studies 
instead consistently confirm that adolescents have the 
cognitive competence to make rational decisions about risks.268 
Researchers have endeavored to determine why adolescents 
nonetheless frequently make irrational, risky decisions. 
Behavioral scientists examined more closely the real-
world contexts269 in which adolescents make decisions, and 
have gained valuable insights into adolescent decision-making 
processes.270 Their findings confirmed adolescents’ competence 
to make rational decisions—at least when making decisions in 
the artificially ideal conditions of the research laboratories in 
which they complete tasks involving minor, symbolic risks.271 
The real-world contexts in which adolescents usually make 
decisions, however, can drastically affect the quality of their 
decision making.272 
  
 264 Valerie F. Reyna & Frank Farley, Risk and Rationality in Adolescent 
Decision Making: Implications for Theory, Practice, and Public Policy, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 
PUB. INT. 1, 33 (2006). 
 265 Id. at 33 (surveying studies of education interventions aiming to seek 
adolescents’ misperceptions by educating them about commonly encountered risks). 
 266 Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 258, at 80. 
 267 Id. 
 268 Id.  
 269 Behavioral scientists define a “context [as] a culturally defined situation that 
(a) occurs in a particular time and place and (b) contains actors who perform culturally 
defined roles.” James P. Byrnes, The Development of Self-Regulated Decision Making, in 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDGMENT, supra note 223, at 5, 7. 
 270 Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 258, at 80. 
 271 Id.; Reyna & Farley, supra note 264, at 2. 
 272 Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk 
Preference, and Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental 
Study, 41 DEV. PSYCHOL. 625, 625 (2005); Reyna & Farley, supra note 264, at 11. 
Cognitive researchers have referred to this as the “competence-performance 
distinction.” Jennifer L. Woolard et al., Theoretical and Methodological Issues in 
Studying Children’s Capacities in Legal Contexts, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 219, 220 (1996) 
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Studies found that contexts that predictably 
compromise adolescent decision making include those requiring 
them to make decisions “[i]n the heat of passion, on the spur of 
the moment, in unfamiliar situations, . . . and when behavioral 
inhibition is required for good outcomes . . . .”273 In other words, 
adolescents tend to make bad decisions in emotionally charged 
or pressured situations, and they struggle to control impulses 
that lead to undesirable behavior.274 
Developmental neuroscientists also study adolescent 
cognitive development and have begun creating a 
neurologically based model primarily oriented around 
development in two neural systems of the brain—the system 
associated with cognitive control, and the one associated with 
socio-emotional maturity. The core insight of this dual-systems 
model is that these two neural systems develop along different 
timelines.275 This temporal disjunction has the potential to 
explain adolescents’ risk taking and poor decision making 
despite their improved cognitive ability, as well as other 
aspects of adolescent psychology and behavior.276 An overview 
of the model’s features follows. 
  
(citations omitted). Consistent with these observations, studies demonstrate that not 
all cognitive processes mature by midadolescence. Some processes, such as certain 
aspects of working memory, continue to specialize and develop into adulthood. Beatriz 
Luna et al., What Has fMRI Told Us About the Development of Cognitive Control 
Through Adolescence?, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 101, 101, 105 (2010) (suggesting that all 
components of working memory mature by the early twenties). Working memory is 
involved in the voluntary control of behavior (including the ability to filter irrelevant 
information and suppress inappropriate actions) and other complex mental abilities. 
Id. at 101.  
 273 Reyna & Farley, supra note 264, at 12; see also Eric Amsel et al., 
Anticipating and Avoiding Regret as a Model of Adolescent Decision-Making, in THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF JUDGMENT, supra note 223, at 119-20. 
 274 Valerie F. Reyna & Frank Farley, Is the Teen Brain Too Rational?, 17 SCI. 
AM. 58, 60 (2007); Reyna & Farley, supra note 264, at 1. Even though they do not 
generally misperceive risks (if anything, studies tend to show that adolescents and 
adults both overestimate risk), adolescents tend to weigh and value benefits more 
heavily than risks, as compared to adults. Researchers advance a number of theories to 
explain this, some related to cognition and others grounded in neural development 
itself. See Fischhoff, supra note 222, at 19-20; Geier & Luna, supra note 257, at 213. 
 275 Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 258, at 97-98; see also 
Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as 
Indexed by Behavior and Self-Report: Evidence for a Dual Systems Model, 44 DEV. 
PSYCHOL. 1764, 1764 (2008) (“Neurobiological evidence in support of the dual systems 
model is rapidly accumulating.”). 
 276 See infra notes 277-94 and accompanying text. For slightly different 
accounts of the dual-systems model, see Casey et al., supra note 257, at 63-64; Geier & 
Luna, supra note 257, at 213; see also Catherine Sebastian et al., Social Brain 
Development and the Affective Consequences of Ostracism in Adolescence, 72 BRAIN & 
COGNITION 134, 138 (2010) (discussing aspects of the dual-systems model). 
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The socio-emotional system within the dual-systems 
model includes neural circuitries across regions of the brain 
implicated in social-information-processing and reward-
seeking/processing.277 When certain neurons (nerve cells that 
transmit information throughout the brain in the form of 
electrical or chemical impulses) are stimulated by a chemical 
impulse, they trigger the release of neurotransmitters that then 
chemically stimulate the next neuron in the circuit.278 In the 
socio-emotional system, the neurotransmitter dopamine 
modulates the neural reward circuitry.279 The mechanisms 
underlying dopamine neurotransmission continue to mature 
during adolescence. Dopaminergic activity peaks rapidly and 
dramatically in early adolescence, around the time of pubertal 
maturation.280 
Researchers believe that this peak in dopaminergic 
activity makes adolescents experience a potentially rewarding 
stimuli as even more rewarding “than would be the case during 
either childhood or adulthood.”281 The resulting heightening of 
reward salience leads to increased sensation seeking—a 
“tendency to seek out novel, varied, and highly stimulating 
experiences, [coupled with a] willingness to take risks in order to 
attain them.”282 Consistent with this theory, studies show that 
sensation seeking, risk preference, susceptibility to deviant or 
antisocial peer influence, and reward sensitivity all follow a 
curvilinear, (“⋂”)-shaped trend. These behavioral characteristics 
begin to increase at age ten, peak around ages fourteen to fifteen 
(depending on the study and measure used), and then decline.283 
The second neural system in the dual-systems model is 
the cognitive control system. Cognitive control refers to the 
abilities to voluntarily coordinate and engage in goal-directed 
behavior.284 This system includes the prefrontal cortex, which is 
  
 277 The socio-emotional system includes the “amygdala, nucleus accumbens, 
orbitofrontal cortex, medial prefrontal cortex, and superior temporal sulcus.” Steinberg, 
Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 258, at 83. 
 278 CHARLES A. NELSON ET AL., NEUROSCIENCE OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: 
THE ROLE OF EXPERIENCE AND THE DEVELOPING BRAIN 24 (2006). 
 279 Geier & Luna, supra note 257, at 216. 
 280 Id. at 216-17; Steinberg et al., supra note 275, at 1764-66. 
 281 Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 258, at 85. 
 282 Id.; Steinberg et al., supra note 275, at 1765. 
 283 Steinberg, Adolescent Brain Development, supra note 258, at 163; Sindy R. 
Sumter et al., The Developmental Pattern of Resistance to Peer Influence in Adolescence: 
Will the Teenager Ever Be Able to Resist?, 32 J. ADOLESCENCE 1009-10 (2009); see also 
Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 258, at 89 (ages thirteen to sixteen); 
Steinberg et al., supra note 275, at 1774 (ages twelve to fifteen). 
 284 Luna et al., supra note 272, at 101. 
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involved in executive, decision-making, and self-regulatory 
functions, and “association” areas, which connect different regions 
of the brain and thus support the complex integration of 
functions.285 The cognitive control system follows a more gradual 
and linear developmental trajectory than does the socio-emotional 
system.286 Three structural changes in the brain characterize the 
maturation of cognitive control during adolescence. 
The first structural change involves a process known as 
synaptic pruning, by which synapses (the point of contact 
between two nerve cells in a given neural circuit) that have not 
been stimulated (due to lack of use) are eliminated, and 
remaining synaptic connections stabilize and strengthen. 
Synaptic pruning begins during childhood and accelerates in 
adolescence, with the prefrontal cortex maturing in 
midadolescence.287 This correlates with the maturation of basic 
cognitive processes by the age of sixteen. 
Second, myelination (a process involving the insulation of 
existing connections between neurons with a fatty layer that 
improves neural connectivity) continues within the regions of the 
cortex and between the different cortical regions through 
adolescence and into the twenties.288 This change correlates with 
observed behavioral improvements in higher-order and executive 
functions (future orientation, planning, response inhibition, 
spatial working memory, etc.) associated with the integrated 
functioning of multiple prefrontal regions of the brain.289 
  
 285 Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 258 at 93-94. The cognitive 
control system also includes parts of the corpus callosum, which connects the left and 
right hemispheres. Beatriz Luna, Developmental Changes in Cognitive Control 
Through Adolescence, in ADVANCES IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR 233, 240 
(Patricia Bauer ed., 2009). 
 286 Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 258, at 93. 
 287 Nitin Gogtay & Paul M. Thompson, Mapping Gray Matter Development: 
Implications for Typical Development and Vulnerability to Psychopathology, 72 BRAIN 
& COGNITION 6, 7 (2010); Tomas Paus, Mapping Brain Maturation and Cognitive 
Development During Adolescence, 9 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 60, 62 (2005); Arthur W. 
Toga et al., Mapping Brain Maturation, 29 TRENDS IN NEUROSCIENCES 148, 149-50 
(2006). There is also some evidence of synaptic pruning in the association areas (areas 
throughout the brain which connect its different regions and support the complex 
integration of interregional function). Luna, supra note 285, at 238. 
 288 Geier & Luna, supra note 257, at 216; Gogtay & Thompson, supra note 
287, at 7; Luna, supra note 285, at 237-41; Tomas Paus, Growth of White Matter in the 
Adolescent Brain: Myelin or Axon?, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 26 (2010); Steinberg, 
Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 258, at 94-96. Since myelination involves the 
“gradual enhancement of established connections”—as opposed to the initial 
establishment of such connections—the “changes in white matter [represent] a 
refinement of executive control processes that are in place earl[ier] in development.” 
Luna, supra note 285, at 239-40. 
 289 Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 258, at 94-96. 
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Third, myelination also continues between the cortex 
and other regions of the brain, including connections between 
regions involved in social and emotional information 
processing, and those involved in cognitive control processes 
(especially the prefrontal regions).290 The increased connectivity 
between these regions correlates with coordination of affect 
(the external expression of emotions) and cognition; emotional 
regulation and impulse control both improve through the 
midtwenties as a result.291 Strategic planning, anticipation of 
future consequences, and resistance to neutral (as opposed to 
antisocial) peer influence and peer influence in general all 
follow the same trajectory, increasing linearly from 
preadolescence through late adolescence and early adulthood.292 
In summary, adolescents’ basic cognitive abilities are 
mature by the age of sixteen, giving them the capacity to 
process information and make rational decisions. But the 
heightened sensitivity to reward that increases and peaks 
around midadolescence inclines young people towards risk 
taking, sensation seeking, and impulsivity. These inclinations 
may dominate or overwhelm their cognitive processes and 
shape their behaviors, especially in situations triggering 
heightened emotion or pressure.293 
Adolescents’ susceptibility to the confounding influence 
of heightened-reward salience on their decision making begins 
to decline after midadolescence, while their ability to exercise 
cognitive control increases, ultimately reaching mature levels 
in their twenties.294 
2. Domain-Specific Competence: The Vote Decision 
By ages fifteen or sixteen, adolescents have attained 
adultlike cognitive-processing capacities.295 In other words, they 
  
 290 Id. at 94-98. Important social and emotional information-processing 
regions of the brain include the limbic and paralimbic regions. Id. at 94-95. 
 291 Id. 
 292 Id.; see also Sumter et al., supra note 283, at 1016 (reporting “a steady 
increase in resistance to general peer influence with age”). See generally Luna et al., 
supra note 272, at 101. 
 293 Luna, supra note 285, at 257; Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra 
note 258, at 96-98. Researchers have generally found the following personality traits 
and contextual factors to correlate with suboptimal choices: sensation seeking, 
impulsivity, competitiveness, overconfidence, and the presence of peers. Byrnes, supra 
note 269, at 31-32. 
 294 Luna, supra note 285, at 257; Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra 
note 258, at 97-98. 
 295 David Archard has addressed the voting age in his now-classic volume on 
children’s rights. He argues for a minimalist concept of voter competence, conceivably 
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are as able as adults to acquire, retain, and retrieve relevant 
information and apply reasoning processes that lead to 
justifiable conclusions. 
But while they have adultlike abilities to think and 
reach rational judgments, their capacities are more susceptible 
to being confounded by the real-world contexts in which they 
make decisions. When they must either make decisions quickly 
or under time pressure, or when they are highly emotional or 
stressed, adolescents’ performance suffers. In contexts in which 
adolescents are likely to make poor decisions—especially when 
their decisions will have negative externalities—the state 
properly constrains their decision-making liberty. 
One example of such a real-world context is driving. 
Driving provides ready opportunities for risk taking and thrill 
seeking—especially in the presence of encouraging peers. At the 
same time, responsible driving frequently requires rapid decision 
making in response to unpredictable situations, in what is still a 
new and unfamiliar context to the inexperienced adolescent 
driver.296 Data on adolescent collisions and motor vehicle-related 
fatalities provide compelling evidence of the challenges 
adolescent drivers face. In other work, I discuss additional 
contexts likely to impair adolescents’ otherwise-mature cognitive-
processing abilities, as well as those contexts in which their 
cognitive-processing abilities (and the rationality and maturity of 
their resulting decisions) are likely to remain uncompromised.297 
Elections, on the other hand, are a decision-making 
domain in which midadolescents’ adultlike cognitive-processing 
abilities should remain uncompromised. Elections unfold over a 
period of time, giving voters the opportunity to deliberate and 
evaluate options without undue pressure. Many sources of 
information are readily available over a period of time as well, 
  
attainable by children as young as eleven, more certainly attainable by teenagers. 
ARCHARD, supra note 10, at 103. To support his claim that children are likely to attain 
the necessary voting competence before the age of eighteen, Archard relies on the 1982 
publication of a study on children’s ability to understand political matters which found 
that “[b]y eleven, many children have as good a working vocabulary for politics as 
many adults could claim, and a framework of ideas which . . . will enable them to grasp 
the facts of current affairs . . . and make their choices at general elections.” Id. (quoting 
OLIVE STEVENS, CHILDREN TALKING POLITICS: POLITICAL LEARNING IN CHILDHOOD 148 
(1982)). For compelling arguments which note some of the unintended negative 
consequences of extending notions of “children’s rights” into fields beyond family law 
(although even there, of course, the concept can have troubling implications), see 
MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS (2005). 
 296 For an argument in favor of additional limits on adolescent driving, see 
Hamilton, supra note 178, at 1064-65. 
 297 See id.; Vivian E. Hamilton, The Age of Marital Capacity: Reconsidering 
Civil Recognition of Adolescent Marriage, 92 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012). 
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which voters can use as a kind of scaffolding or heuristics to 
help them evaluate their choices—broadcast debates, 
endorsements of candidates, party affiliations, etc. Voting itself 
is done anonymously and in private, which diminishes the 
concern that adolescents’ choices will be unduly pressured or 
influenced by peers.298 
By the age of sixteen, adolescents meet the standard of 
electoral competence defined above, where “a minimally 
competent voting decision involves an adultlike application and 
coordination of various reasoning processes to make a choice 
that could be justified by a good-enough reason.”299 
Finally, Lau and Redlawsk’s test for correct voting300 
may help assess adolescents’ vote decisions. Lau and 
Redlawsk’s mock-election study predicted that 70 percent of 
voters vote correctly; their study of the nine actual presidential 
elections from 1988 to 2004 showed that the mean number of 
correct voters was just over 75 percent.301 Empirical studies of 
correct voting might thus be used as a benchmark or test of 
adolescent voting competence: if adolescents cast correct votes 
between 70 to 75 percent of the time, then they have achieved 
adultlike levels of competence.302 
CONCLUSION 
Even without including the numerous policy 
considerations that support lowering the voting age (for 
example, making tangible and relevant to young people the 
civic education they receive in middle and secondary schools, 
and encouraging interest in, and habits of, civic participation), 
compelling reasons to do so—grounded in foundational 
democratic principles—have emerged. I have argued that 
democratic legitimacy requires the presumptive electoral 
  
 298 See Catherine J. Ross, A Stable Paradigm: Revisiting Capacity, Vulnerability 
and the Rights Claims of Adolescents after Roper v. Simmons, in LAW, MIND AND BRAIN 
(Michael Freeman & Oliver R. Goodenough eds., 2009) 183, 184-87, 193-96 (discussing 
adolescent decision making by the Supreme Court in Roper and arguing for a paradigm of 
rights that accounts both for adolescents’ vulnerabilities and capacities). 
 299 See supra Part III.A.4.  
 300 To determine a correct vote, Lau and Redlawsk ask whether “[i]rrespective 
of how the vote decision is actually reached, how frequently do voters vote correctly.” 
See supra notes 226-37 and accompanying text; LAU & REDLAWSK, supra note 209, at 
88; see also Richard R. Lau et al., An Exploration of Correct Voting in Recent U.S. 
Presidential Elections, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 395 (2008). 
 301 LAU & REDLAWSK, supra note 209, at 85, 88; Lau et al., supra note 300, at 406. 
 302 An arguably more radical approach might rely on aggregation models to 
find adolescent voters competent once they have reached a significantly lower 
threshold of correct voting—presumably something greater than 50 percent. 
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inclusion of members of the political community. Democratic 
systems may nonetheless legitimately impose competence-
related electoral qualifications. Voter qualification rules 
excluding citizens younger than eighteen from the electorate 
are justified by the presumed electoral incompetence of that 
category of citizens, but the requirements of electoral 
competence remain unspecified. By studying voter decision 
making and the development of cognitive-processing skills, it is 
possible to derive a pragmatic conception of electoral 
competence. Research demonstrates that young people reliably 
attain electoral competence by the age of fifteen or sixteen. 
Thus, labeling them incompetent is error and can no longer 
justify their continued exclusion. 
States should thus lower the age of electoral majority to 
sixteen, by which age it is safe to say that adolescent citizens 
will be competent voters. 
